In this scheme of confederacy all power of taxation was expressly left to the several colonies.  The scheme provided for a mere league, not for a federal union.  The government of the Commissioners acted only upon the local governments, not upon individuals.  The Board had thus but little executive power, and was hardly more than a consulting body.  Another source of weakness in the confederacy was the overwhelming preponderance of Massachusetts.  Of the 24,000 people in the confederation, 15,000 belonged to Massachusetts, while the other three colonies had only about 3,000 each.  Massachusetts accordingly had to carry the heaviest burden, both in the furnishing of soldiers and in the payment of war expenses, while in the direction of affairs she had no more authority than one of the small colonies.  As a natural consequence, Massachusetts tried to exert more authority than she was entitled to by the articles of confederation; and such conduct was not unnaturally resented by the small colonies, as betokening an unfair and domineering spirit.  In spite of these drawbacks, however, the league was of great value to New England.  On many occasions it worked well as a high court of jurisdiction, and it made the military strength of the colonies more available than it would otherwise have been.  But for the interference of the British government, which brought it to an untimely end, the Confederacy might have been gradually amended so as to become enduring.  After its downfall it was pleasantly remembered by the people of New England; in times of trouble their thoughts reverted to it; and the historian must in fairness assign it some share in preparing men’s minds for the greater work of federation which was achieved before the end of the following century. [Sidenote:  It was only a league, not a federal union]

The formation of such a confederacy certainly involved something very like a tacit assumption of sovereignty on the part of the four colonies.  It is worthy of note that they did not take the trouble to ask the permission of the home government in advance.  They did as they pleased, and then defended their action afterward.  In England the act of confederation was regarded with jealousy and distrust.  But Edward Winslow, who was sent over to London to defend the colonies, pithily said:  “If we in America should forbear to unite for offence and defence against a common enemy till we have leave from England, our throats might be all cut before the messenger would be half seas through.”  Whether such considerations would have had weight with Charles I. or not was now of little consequence.  His power of making mischief soon came to an end, and from the liberal and sagacious policy of Cromwell the Confederacy had not much to fear.  Nevertheless the fall of Charles I. brought up for the first time that question which a century later was to acquire surpassing interest,—­the question as to the supremacy of Parliament over the colonies.