And this respondent, further answering, says that this hope not having been realized, the President was compelled either to allow the said Stanton to resume the said office and remain therein contrary to the settled convictions of the President, formed as aforesaid, respecting the powers confided to him and the duties required of him by the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to the opinion formed as aforesaid that the first section of the last-mentioned act did not affect the case of the said Stanton, and contrary to the fixed belief of the President that he could no longer advise with or trust or be responsible for the said Stanton in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or else he was compelled to take such steps as might in the judgment of the President be lawful and necessary to raise for a judicial decision the questions affecting the lawful right of the said Stanton to resume the said office or the power of the said Stanton to persist in refusing to quit the said office if he should persist in actually refusing to quit the same; and to this end, and to this end only, this respondent did, on the 21st day of February, 1868, issue the order for the removal of the said Stanton, in the said first article mentioned and set forth, and the order authorizing the said Lorenzo Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim, in the said second article set forth.

And this respondent, proceeding to answer specifically each substantial allegation in the said first article, says:  He denies that the said Stanton, on the 21st day of February, 1868, was lawfully in possession of the said office of Secretary for the Department of War.  He denies that the said Stanton, on the day last mentioned, was lawfully entitled to hold the said office against the will of the President of the United States.  He denies that the said order for the removal of the said Stanton was unlawfully issued.  He denies that the said order was issued with intent to violate the act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices.”  He denies that the said order was a violation of the last-mentioned act.  He denies that the said order was a violation of the Constitution of the United States, or of any law thereof, or of his oath of office.  He denies that the said order was issued with an intent to violate the Constitution of the United States, or any law thereof, or this respondent’s oath of office; and he respectfully but earnestly insists that not only was it issued by him in the performance of what he believed to be an imperative official duty, but in the performance of what this honorable court will consider was, in point of fact, an imperative official duty.  And he denies that any and all substantive matters in the said first article contained, in manner and form as the same are therein stated and set forth, do by law constitute a high misdemeanor in office within the true intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States.