I repeat that my own convictions as to the true construction of the law and as to its constitutionality were well settled and were sustained by every member of my Cabinet, including Mr. Stanton himself.  Upon the question of constitutionality, each one in turn deliberately advised me that the tenure-of-office act was unconstitutional.  Upon the question whether, as to those members who were appointed by my predecessor, that act took from me the power to remove them, one of those members emphatically stated in the presence of the others sitting in Cabinet that they did not come within the provisions of the act, and it was no protection to them.  No one dissented from this construction, and I understood them all to acquiesce in its correctness.  In a matter of such grave consequence I was not disposed to rest upon my own opinions, though fortified by my constitutional advisers.  I have therefore sought to bring the question at as early a day as possible before the Supreme Court of the United States for final and authoritative decision.

In respect to so much of the resolution as relates to the designation of an officer to act as Secretary of War ad interim, I have only to say that I have exercised this power under the provisions of the first section of the act of February 13, 1795, which, so far as they are applicable to vacancies caused by removals, I understand to be still in force.

The legislation upon the subject of ad interim appointments in the Executive Departments stands, as to the War Office, as follows: 

The second section of the act of the 7th of August, 1789, makes provision for a vacancy in the very case of a removal of the head of the War Department, and upon such a vacancy gives the charge and custody of the records, books, and papers to the chief clerk.  Next, by the act of the 8th of May, 1792, section 8, it is provided that in case of a vacancy occasioned by death, absence from the seat of Government, or sickness of the head of the War Department the President may authorize a person to perform the duties of the office until a successor is appointed or the disability removed.  The act, it will be observed, does not provide for the case of a vacancy caused by removal.  Then, by the first section of the act of February 13, 1795, it is provided that in case of any vacancy the President may appoint a person to perform the duties while the vacancy exists.

These acts are followed by that of the 20th of February, 1863, by the first section of which provision is again made for a vacancy caused by death, resignation, absence from the seat of Government, or sickness of the head of any Executive Department of the Government, and upon the occurrence of such a vacancy power is given to the President—­