An examination of this act, then, shows that while in one part of the section provision is made for officers generally, in another clause there is a class of officers, designated by their official titles, who are excepted from the general terms of the law, and in reference to whom a clear distinction is made as to the general power of removal limited in the first clause of the section.

This distinction is that as to such of these enumerated officers as hold under the appointment of the President the power of removal can only be exercised by him with the consent of the Senate, while as to those who have not been appointed by him there is no like denial of his power to displace them.  It would be a violation of the plain meaning of this enactment to place Mr. Stanton upon the same footing as those heads of Departments who have been appointed by myself.  As to him, this law gives him no tenure of office.  The members of my Cabinet who have been appointed by me are by this act entitled to hold for one month after the term of my office shall cease; but Mr. Stanton could not, against the wishes of my successor, hold a moment thereafter.  If he were permitted by that successor to hold for the first two weeks, would that successor have no power to remove him?  But the power of my successor over him could be no greater than my own.  If my successor would have the power to remove Mr. Stanton after permitting him to remain a period of two weeks, because he was not appointed by him, but by his predecessor, I, who have tolerated Mr. Stanton for more than two years, certainly have the same right to remove him, and upon the same ground, namely, that he was not appointed by me, but by my predecessor.

Under this construction of the tenure-of-office act, I have never doubted my power to remove Mr. Stanton.

Whether the act were constitutional or not, it was always my opinion that it did not secure him from removal.  I was, however, aware that there were doubts as to the construction of the law, and from the first I deemed it desirable that at the earliest possible moment those doubts should be settled and the true construction of the act fixed by decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.  My order of suspension in August last was intended to place the case in such a position as would make a resort to a judicial decision both necessary and proper.  My understanding and wishes, however, under that order of suspension were frustrated, and the late order for Mr. Stanton’s removal was a further step toward the accomplishment of that purpose.