does not content himself with assuming that public considerations bearing upon his continuance in office form as fully a rule of action for himself as for the President, and that upon so delicate a question as the fitness of an officer for continuance in his office the officer is as competent and as impartial to decide as his superior, who is responsible for his conduct.  But he goes further, and plainly intimates what he means by “public considerations of a high character,” and this is nothing else than his loss of confidence in his superior.  He says that these public considerations have “alone induced me to continue at the head of this Department,” and that they “constrain me not to resign the office of Secretary of War before the next meeting of Congress.”

This language is very significant.  Mr. Stanton holds the position unwillingly.  He continues in office only under a sense of high public duty.  He is ready to leave when it is safe to leave, and as the danger he apprehends from his removal then will not exist when Congress is here, he is constrained to remain during the interim.  What, then, is that danger which can only be averted by the presence of Mr. Stanton or of Congress?  Mr. Stanton does not say that “public considerations of a high character” constrain him to hold on to the office indefinitely.  He does not say that no one other than himself can at any time be found to take his place and perform its duties.  On the contrary, he expresses a desire to leave the office at the earliest moment consistent with these high public considerations.  He says, in effect, that while Congress is away he must remain, but that when Congress is here he can go.  In other words, he has lost confidence in the President.  He is unwilling to leave the War Department in his hands or in the hands of anyone the President may appoint or designate to perform its duties.  If he resigns, the President may appoint a Secretary of War that Mr. Stanton does not approve; therefore he will not resign.  But when Congress is in session the President can not appoint a Secretary of War which the Senate does not approve; consequently when Congress meets Mr. Stanton is ready to resign.

Whatever cogency these “considerations” may have had on Mr. Stanton, whatever right he may have had to entertain such considerations, whatever propriety there might be in the expression of them to others, one thing is certain, it was official misconduct, to say the least of it, to parade them before his superior officer.

Upon the receipt of this extraordinary note I only delayed the order of suspension long enough to make the necessary arrangements to fill the office.  If this were the only cause for his suspension, it would be ample.  Necessarily it must end our most important official relations, for I can not imagine a degree of effrontery which would embolden the head of a Department to take his seat at the council table in the Executive Mansion after such an act; nor can