of his office and save the life of the nation at all hazards.  The so-called reconstruction acts, though as plainly unconstitutional as any that can be imagined, were not believed to be within the class last mentioned.  The people were not wholly disarmed of the power of self-defense.  In all the Northern States they still held in their hands the sacred right of the ballot, and it was safe to believe that in due time they would come to the rescue of their own institutions.  It gives me pleasure to add that the appeal to our common constituents was not taken in vain, and that my confidence in their wisdom and virtue seems not to have been misplaced.

It is well and publicly known that enormous frauds have been perpetrated on the Treasury and that colossal fortunes have been made at the public expense.  This species of corruption has increased, is increasing, and if not diminished will soon bring us into total ruin and disgrace.  The public creditors and the taxpayers are alike interested in an honest administration of the finances, and neither class will long endure the large-handed robberies of the recent past.  For this discreditable state of things there are several causes.  Some of the taxes are so laid as to present an irresistible temptation to evade payment.  The great sums which officers may win by connivance at fraud create a pressure which is more than the virtue of many can withstand, and there can be no doubt that the open disregard of constitutional obligations avowed by some of the highest and most influential men in the country has greatly weakened the moral sense of those who serve in subordinate places.  The expenses of the United States, including interest on the public debt, are more than six times as much as they were seven years ago.  To collect and disburse this vast amount requires careful supervision as well as systematic vigilance.  The system, never perfected, was much disorganized by the “tenure-of-office bill,” which has almost destroyed official accountability.  The President may be thoroughly convinced that an officer is incapable, dishonest, or unfaithful to the Constitution, but under the law which I have named the utmost he can do is to complain to the Senate and ask the privilege of supplying his place with a better man.  If the Senate be regarded as personally or politically hostile to the President, it is natural, and not altogether unreasonable, for the officer to expect that it will take his part as far as possible, restore him to his place, and give him a triumph over his Executive superior.  The officer has other chances of impunity arising from accidental defects of evidence, the mode of investigating it, and the secrecy of the hearing.  It is not wonderful that official malfeasance should become bold in proportion as the delinquents learn to think themselves safe.  I am entirely persuaded that under such a rule the President can not perform the great duty assigned to him of seeing the laws faithfully executed, and that it disables him most especially from enforcing that rigid accountability which is necessary to the due execution of the revenue laws.