the United States, and slavery was declared no longer to exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.  If these seven States were not legal States of the Union, it follows as an inevitable consequence that in some of the States slavery yet exists.  It does not exist in these seven States, for they have abolished it also in their State constitutions; but Kentucky not having done so, it would still remain in that State.  But, in truth, if this assumption that these States have no legal State governments be true, then the abolition of slavery by these illegal governments binds no one, for Congress now denies to these States the power to abolish slavery by denying to them the power to elect a legal State legislature, or to frame a constitution for any purpose, even for such a purpose as the abolition of slavery.

As to the other constitutional amendment, having reference to suffrage, it happens that these States have not accepted it.  The consequence is that it has never been proclaimed or understood, even by Congress, to be a part of the Constitution of the United States.  The Senate of the United States has repeatedly given its sanction to the appointment of judges, district attorneys, and marshals for every one of these States; yet, if they are not legal States, not one of these judges is authorized to hold a court.  So, too, both Houses of Congress have passed appropriation bills to pay all these judges, attorneys, and officers of the United States for exercising their functions in these States.  Again, in the machinery of the internal-revenue laws all these States are districted, not as “Territories,” but as “States.”

So much for continuous legislative recognition.  The instances cited, however, fall far short of all that might be enumerated.  Executive recognition, as is well known, has been frequent and unwavering.  The same maybe said as to judicial recognition through the Supreme Court of the United States.  That august tribunal, from first to last, in the administration of its duties in banc and upon the circuit, has never failed to recognize these ten communities as legal States of the Union.  The cases depending in that court upon appeal and writ of error from these States when the rebellion began have not been dismissed upon any idea of the cessation of jurisdiction.  They were carefully continued from term to term until the rebellion was entirely subdued and peace reestablished, and then they were called for argument and consideration as if no insurrection had intervened.  New cases, occurring since the rebellion, have come from these States before that court by writ of error and appeal, and even by original suit, where only “a State” can bring such a suit.  These cases are entertained by that tribunal in the exercise of its acknowledged jurisdiction, which could not attach to them if they had come from any political body other than a State of the Union.  Finally, in the allotment of their