Of what avail will it be to any one of these Southern people when seized by a file of soldiers to ask for the cause of arrest or for the production of the warrant?  Of what avail to ask for the privilege of bail when in military custody, which knows no such thing as bail?  Of what avail to demand a trial by jury, process for witnesses, a copy of the indictment, the privilege of counselor that greater privilege, the writ of habeas corpus?

The veto of the original bill of the 2d of March was based on two distinct grounds—­the interference of Congress in matters strictly appertaining to the reserved powers of the States and the establishment of military tribunals for the trial of citizens in time of peace.  The impartial reader of that message will understand that all that it contains with respect to military despotism and martial law has reference especially to the fearful power conferred on the district commanders to displace the criminal courts and assume jurisdiction to try and to punish by military boards; that, potentially, the suspension of the habeas corpus was martial law and military despotism.  The act now before me not only declares that the intent was to confer such military authority, but also to confer unlimited military authority over all the other courts of the State and over all the officers of the State—­legislative, executive, and judicial.  Not content with the general grant of power, Congress, in the second section of this bill, specifically gives to each military commander the power “to suspend or remove from office, or from the performance of official duties and the exercise of official powers, any officer or person holding or exercising, or professing to hold or exercise, any civil or military office or duty in such district under any power, election, appointment, or authority derived from, or granted by, or claimed under any so-called State, or the government thereof, or any municipal or other division thereof.”

A power that hitherto all the departments of the Federal Government, acting in concert or separately, have not dared to exercise is here attempted to be conferred on a subordinate military officer.  To him, as a military officer of the Federal Government, is given the power, supported by “a sufficient military force,” to remove every civil officer of the State.  What next?  The district commander, who has thus displaced the civil officer, is authorized to fill the vacancy by the detail of an officer or soldier of the Army, or by the appointment of “some other person.”

This military appointee, whether an officer, a soldier, or “some other person,” is to perform “the duties of such officer or person so suspended or removed.”  In other words, an officer or soldier of the Army is thus transformed into a civil officer.  He may be made a governor, a legislator, or a judge.  However unfit he may deem himself for such civil duties, he must obey the order.  The officer of the Army must, if “detailed,” go upon the supreme bench of the State with the same prompt obedience as if he were detailed to go upon a court-martial.  The soldier, if detailed to act as a justice of the peace, must obey as quickly as if he were detailed for picket duty.