supposed want of responsibility on the part of the President, and from an imagined defect of guaranties against a vicious President who might incline to abuse the power.  On the other hand, an exclusive power of removal by the President was defended as a true exposition of the text of the Constitution.  It was maintained that there are certain causes for which persons ought to be removed from office without being guilty of treason, bribery, or malfeasance, and that the nature of things demands that it should be so.  “Suppose,” it was said, “a man becomes insane by the visitation of God and is likely to ruin our affairs; are the hands of the Government to be confined from warding off the evil?  Suppose a person in office not possessing the talents he was judged to have at the time of the appointment; is the error not to be corrected?  Suppose he acquires vicious habits and incurable indolence or total neglect of the duties of his office, which shall work mischief to the public welfare; is there no way to arrest the threatened danger?  Suppose he becomes odious and unpopular by reason of the measures he pursues—­and this he may do without committing any positive offense against the law; must he preserve his office in despite of the popular will?  Suppose him grasping for his own aggrandizement and the elevation of his connections by every means short of the treason defined by the Constitution, hurrying your affairs to the precipice of destruction, endangering your domestic tranquillity, plundering you of the means of defense, alienating the affections of your allies and promoting the spirit of discord; must the tardy, tedious, desultory road by way of impeachment be traveled to overtake the man who, barely confining himself within the letter of the law, is employed in drawing off the vital principle of the Government?  The nature of things, the great objects of society, the express objects of the Constitution itself, require that this thing should be otherwise.  To unite the Senate with the President in the exercise of the power,” it was said, “would involve us in the most serious difficulty.  Suppose a discovery of any of those events should take place when the Senate is not in session; how is the remedy to be applied?  The evil could be avoided in no other way than by the Senate sitting always.”  In regard to the danger of the power being abused if exercised by one man it was said “that the danger is as great with respect to the Senate, who are assembled from various parts of the continent, with different impressions and opinions;” “that such a body is more likely to misuse the power of removal than the man whom the united voice of America calls to the Presidential chair.  As the nature of government requires the power of removal,” it was maintained “that it should be exercised in this way by the hand capable of exerting itself with effect; and the power must be conferred on the President by the Constitution as the executive officer of the Government.”