The only ground upon which this kind of legislation can be justified is that of the war-making power.  The act of which this bill is intended as amendatory was passed during the existence of the war.  By its own provisions it is to terminate within one year from the cessation of hostilities and the declaration of peace.  It is therefore yet in existence, and it is likely that it will continue in force as long as the freedmen may require the benefit of its provisions.  It will certainly remain in operation as a law until some months subsequent to the meeting of the next session of Congress, when, if experience shall make evident the necessity of additional legislation, the two Houses will have ample time to mature and pass the requisite measures.  In the meantime the questions arise, Why should this war measure be continued beyond the period designated in the original act, and why in time of peace should military tribunals be created to continue until each “State shall be fully restored in its constitutional relations to the Government and shall be duly represented in the Congress of the United States”?

It was manifest, with respect to the act approved March 3, 1865, that prudence and wisdom alike required that jurisdiction over all cases concerning the free enjoyment of the immunities and rights of citizenship, as well as the protection of person and property, should be conferred upon some tribunal in every State or district where the ordinary course of judicial proceedings was interrupted by the rebellion, and until the same should be fully restored.  At that time, therefore, an urgent necessity existed for the passage of some such law.  Now, however, war has substantially ceased; the ordinary course of judicial proceedings is no longer interrupted; the courts, both State and Federal, are in full, complete, and successful operation, and through them every person, regardless of race and color, is entitled to and can be heard.  The protection granted to the white citizen is already conferred by law upon the freedman; strong and stringent guards, by way of penalties and punishments, are thrown around his person and property, and it is believed that ample protection will be afforded him by due process of law, without resort to the dangerous expedient of “military tribunals,” now that the war has been brought to a close.  The necessity no longer existing for such tribunals, which had their origin in the war, grave objections to their continuance must present themselves to the minds of all reflecting and dispassionate men.  Independently of the danger, in representative republics, of conferring upon the military, in time of peace, extraordinary powers—­so carefully guarded against by the patriots and statesmen of the earlier days of the Republic, so frequently the ruin of governments founded upon the same free principles, and subversive of the rights and liberties of the citizen—­the question of practical economy earnestly commends itself to the consideration