to land at Himera, force his way into Syracuse, and give new life.  Nicias was guilty of the blunder of allowing Gylippus to land at Himera, to aid the defence, at the moment when it was on the point of capitulation.  A long contest followed, the Athenians endeavouring to complete the investing lines, the Syracusans to pierce them with counterworks.  Nicias sent to Athens for reinforcements, while the Syracusans were energetically fitting out a fleet and appealing for air in the Peloponnese.  Nicias, in fact, was extremely despondent and anxious to resign; the Athenians, however, answered his dispatches by preparing a great reinforcement under the command of Demosthenes, without accepting the resignation of Nicias.  The Lacedaemonians, however, also sent some reinforcements; at the same time they formally declared war, and carried out the plan of occupying and fortifying Decelea, which completely commanded the Athenian territory and was the cause of untold loss and suffering.

Now, at Syracuse the besieged took the offensive both by sea and land, and were worsted on the water, but captured some of the Athenian forts, commanding the entry to the besiegers’ lines—­a serious disaster.  By the time that Demosthenes with his reinforcements reached Sicily nearly the whole island had come over to the side of Syracuse.  Before this, the Syracusans had again challenged an engagement both by sea and land, with results indecisive on the first day but distinctly in their favour on the second.  At this juncture, Demosthenes arrived, and, seeing the necessity for immediate action, made a night attack on the Syracusan lines; but, his men falling into confusion after a first success, the attempt was disastrously repulsed.

Demosthenes was quick to realise that the whole situation was hopeless; but Nicias lacked nerve to accept the responsibility of retiring, and also had some idea that affairs within Syracuse were favourable.  His obstinacy gave Demosthenes and his colleague Eurymedon the impression that he was guided by secret information.  And now it became the primary object of Gylippus and the Syracusans to keep the Athenians from retiring.  Another naval defeat reduced the Athenians to despair; they resolved that they must cut their way out.

The desperate attempt was made, but by almost hopeless men against an enemy now full of confidence.  To the excited, almost agonised, watchers on shore, it seemed for a brief space that the ships might force a passage; the fight was a frenzied scuffle; but presently the terrible truth was realised—­the Athenian ships were being driven ashore.  The last hope of escape by sea was gone, for, though there were still ships enough, the sailors were too utterly demoralised to make the attempt.