The definite fact emerged, that neither the senatorial nor the democratic party could establish a strong government; that would be possible only for a military monarchy—­a statesman with a policy and an irresistible, force at his back.  But Pompeius lacked the courage and skill.  Caesar, as yet, lacked the military force.  Pompeius, on his return from the East, again allied himself with Crassus and Caesar, whose object was to acquire for himself the opportunity which Pompeius would not grasp.  The alliance gave Pompeius the land allotments he required for his soldiers, and to Caesar the consulship followed by a prolonged governorship of Gaul.

The conquest and organisation of Gaul was an end in itself, a necessary defence against barbarian pressure.  Caesar’s operations there were invaluable to the empire; incidentally, they enabled him to become master of it.  Caesar has left his own record.  Gaul was transformed into a barrier against the Teutonic migration.  But Pompeius, nominally holding a far greater position, proved incapable of controlling the situation in Rome; he could not even suppress the demagogue Clodius, while the prestige of his military exploits was waning.  Fear of the power of the Triumvirate was driving moderate men to the senatorial part; that party, without an efficient leader, began to find in Pompeius rather in ally against the more dangerous Caesar than an enemy.

But they would not concede him the powers he required; which might yet be turned to the uses of his colleagues in the Triumvirate; he could not afford to challenge Caesar; and Caesar adroitly used the situation to secure for himself a prolongation of his Gallic command.  The completion of his work there was to have precedence of his personal ambitions.  Crassus was sent to the Eastern command; and Pompeius remained in Italy, while nominally appointed to Spain.

Pompeius, indeed, attained a predominance in Rome which enabled him to secure temporarily dictatorial powers which were employed to counteract the electoral machinery of the republican party; but he had not the qualifications or the inclination to play the demagogue, and could not unite his aspirations as a restorer of law and order with effective party leadership.  Crassus disappeared; his armies in the East met with a complete disaster at Carrhae, and he took his own life.  Caesar and Pompeius were left; Pompeius was not content that Caesar should stand on a real equality with him, and the inevitable rupture came.

In effect Pompeius used his dictatorship to extend his own military command and to curtail Caesar’s.  The position resolved itself into a rivalry between the two; Caesar declaring as always for the democracy, Pompeius now assuming the championship of the aristocracy, and the guardianship of the constitution.

For Caesar the vital point now was that his own command should not terminate till he exchanged it for a fresh consulship.  As the law now stood, he could not obtain his election without resigning his command beforehand.  But he succeeded in forcing Pompeius to break the law; and in making the official government responsible for declaring war.  He offered a compromise, perhaps, in the certainty that it would be rejected—­as it was.  He was virtually declared a public enemy; and he struck at once.