That hegemony, however, had to be established by persistent compulsion, and there were three stages in its completion.  First, the subjection of the Latins and Campanians; then the struggle of Rome with the Umbrian-Samnites; finally, the decisive repulse of the Epirote invader Pyrrhus—­in effect a Hellenic movement.  The Roman supremacy established through the exhaustion of the valiant Samnites required to be confirmed by stern repression of attempts to recover liberty.  But the Hellenic element in Italy, antagonistic to the growing Roman power, in effect invited the intervention of the Epirote chief.  But his scheme was not that of an imperial statesman, but of a chivalrous and romantic warrior.  His own political blunders and the iron determination of the Romans, destroyed his chances of conquest.  His retirement left Rome undisputed lord of Italy; which in part shared full citizenship, in part possessed only the more restricted Latin rights, and in part only rights conceded under varying treaties.

A sense of common Italian nationality was developing.  But if Rome was queen of Italy, Carthage was queen of the seas.  Maritime expansion was precluded, though Rome’s position fitted her for it.  Carthage was the one Phoenician state which developed political as well as commercial power.  The commercial cities of North Africa were in subordination to her, in the Western Mediterranean she had no rivals, her domestic government was oligarchical.

Roman intervention in the affairs of Sicily, where Carthage was the dominant power, produced the rupture between the two great states which was bound to come sooner or later.  Sicily itself was the scene of the initial struggle, which taught Rome that her victories on land were liable to be nullified by the Carthaginian sea power.  She resolved to build a navy, on the plan of adopting boarding tactics which would assimilate a naval engagement to a battle on land.  These tactics were successful enough to equalise the fighting value of the respective fleets.  The Romans were enabled to land an invading army under Regulus in Africa.

Though superior on land, the general’s blundering led to a disaster, and for some time misfortune by sea and failure by land dogged the Romans.  But Carthage failed to use her opportunity; she did not attempt to strike a crushing blow when she could have done so.  But the private energy of Roman patriots at last placed on the seas a fleet which once more turned the scale, whereas it was on land that the brilliant Carthaginian Hamilcar had displayed his genius and daring.  The first Punic War gave Rome predominance in Sicily, and a position of maritime equality.  Sardinia was added to the Roman dominion, and her provincial administration came into being.

She was carrying her expansion farther over Celtic regions, when Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, hurled himself against her, and came near to destroying her.  Hamilcar had conceived the idea of imperial expansion, and given it shape by creating a dominion in Spain; he had looked forward to the life-and-death struggle with Rome that was destined to his son; for which Spain was to be the base.  Hannibal, left in control in Spain, deliberately challenged Rome to war.