The second imputation that maie be laid to vs, was, that we did abandon Cales, when we were possesst of it, whereas the holding of it would haue ben a naile not in the foote of this great monarch but in his side, and haue serued for a diversion of all the wars in these parts. To which I aunswere, that some of our sea-commaunders, and especiallie my colleague, did not onelie oppose themselues to that designe, (whose oppositions mine instructions made an absolute barre,) but when we came to see how the forces that should be left there might be victualed till succours came, the victualls were for the most part hidden and embeazled, and euery ship began at that instant to feare their wants, and to talke of goeing home; soe as I should neither haue had one ship to staie at Cales, nor victualls for the garrison for 2. moneths. And therefore I was forced to leaue Cales, and did not choose to abandon it.
The third obiection we haue to aunswere is, whie we did not lie for the carricks and Indian ships, seing we were on the coast the verie time that is thought fittest for their intercepting and vsual of their retourne. In which I must first cite the testimonie of all our commanders by land and sea, that when we had in our retourne from Cales doubled the Cape St. Vincent comonlie called the South Cape, I vrged our going to th’ Islands of Ozores, founding my selfe vpon these reasons: first, that it was more certaine to attend them at the land-fall where theie must needs touch, then to seeke them in the wide sea; and next, that the aduises sent out of Spaine and Portingall since our being of myght meete them at the Islands, and make them divert from coming thither. Besides, the Spaniards after theie saw vs engaged at Cales would neuer suspect or dreame of our goeing to the Islands. And when this counsell was reiected, and we come in the sight of Lisbon, I there againe pressed the lieing for them with a selected fleet, and offered vpon that condition to send home the land-forces, and all such ships as