in winning the good opinions of the French Canadian majority and making himself an exceptionally popular civil governor.  After closing the accounts of the war, the government felt it expedient to stop such irregular proceedings, to obtain from the legislature a general appropriation act, covering the amount of expenditures in the past, and to prevent the necessity of such a questionable application of provincial funds in the future.  This may be considered the beginning of the financial controversies that were so constant, as years passed by, between the governors and the assemblies, and never ended until the rebellion broke out.  The assembly, desirous of obtaining power in the management of public affairs, learned that it could best embarrass the government and force them to consider and adjust public grievances, as set forth by the majority in the house, by means of the appropriation bills required for the public service.  The assembly not only determined to exercise sole control over its own funds but eventually demanded the disposal of the duties imposed and regulated by imperial statutes.  The conflict was remarkable for the hot and uncompromising temper constantly exhibited by the majority on the discussion of the generally moderate and fair propositions submitted by the government for settling vexed questions.  The assembly found a powerful argument in favour of their persistent contention for a complete control of the public revenues and expenditures in the defalcation of Mr. Caldwell, the receiver-general, who had been allowed for years to use the public funds in his business speculations, and whose property was entirely inadequate to cover the deficiency in his accounts.

The legislative council was always ready to resist what it often asserted to be unconstitutional acts on the part of the house and direct infringements of “the rights of the crown” sometimes a mere convenient phrase used in an emergency to justify resistance to the assembly.  It often happened, however, that the upper chamber had law on its side, when the house became perfectly unreasonable and uncompromising in its attitude of hostility to the government.  The council, on several occasions, rejected a supply bill because it contained provisions asserting the assembly’s right to control the crown revenues and to vote the estimates, item by item, from the governor’s salary down to that of the humblest official.  Every part of the official and legislative machinery became clogged by the obstinacy of governor, councils, and assembly.  To such an extent, indeed, did the assembly’s assumption of power carry it in 1836, that the majority actually asserted its own right to amend the constitution of the council as defined in the imperial statute of 1791.  Its indiscreet acts eventually alienated the sympathy and support of such English members as Mr. Neilson, a journalist and politician of repute, Mr. Andrew Stuart, a lawyer of ability, and others who believed in the necessity of constitutional reforms, but could not follow Mr. Papineau and his party in their reckless career of attack on the government, which they thought would probably in the end imperil British connection.