In an Appendix to this history I have given comparisons in parallel columns between the principal provisions of the federal constitutions of the Canadian Dominion, and the Australian Commonwealth.  In studying carefully these two systems we must be impressed by the fact that the constitution of Canada appears more influenced by the spirit of English ideas than the constitution of Australia, which has copied some features of the fundamental law of the United States.  In the preamble of the Canadian British North America act we find expressly stated “the desire of the Canadian provinces to be federally united into one Dominion under the crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom,” while the preamble of the Australian constitution contains only a bald statement of an agreement “to unite in one indissoluble federal Commonwealth under the crown,” When we consider the use of “Commonwealth”—­a word of republican significance to British ears—­as well as the selection of “state” instead of “province,” of “house of representatives” instead of “house of commons,” of “executive council” instead of “privy council,” we may well wonder why the Australians, all British by origin and aspiration, should have shown an inclination to deviate from the precedents established by the Canadian Dominion, which, though only partly English, resolved to carve the ancient historic names of the parent state on the very front of its political structure.

As the several States of the Commonwealth have full control of their own constitutions, they may choose at any moment to elect their own governors as in the States of the American Union, instead of having them appointed by the crown as in Canada.  We see also an imitation of the American constitution in the principle which allots to the central government only certain enumerated powers, and leaves the residuary power of legislation to the States.  Again, while the act provides for a high and other federal courts, the members of which are to be appointed and removed as in Canada by the central government, the States are still to have full jurisdiction over the State courts as in the United States.  The Canadian constitution, which gives to the Dominion exclusive control over the appointment and removal of the judges of all the superior courts, offers a positive guarantee against the popular election of judges in the provinces.  It is not going too far to suppose that, with the progress of democratic ideas in Australia—­a country inclined to political experiments—­we may find the experience of the United States repeated, and see elective judges make their appearance when a wave of democracy has suddenly swept away all dictates of prudence and given unbridled licence to professional political managers only anxious for the success of party.  In allowing the British Parliament to amend the Act of Union on an address of the Canadian parliament,