can be seen throughout its governmental machinery, in the system of parliamentary government, in the constitution of the privy council and the houses of parliament, in an independent judiciary, in appointed officials of every class—­in the provincial as well as Dominion system—­in a permanent and non-political civil service, and in all elements of sound administration.  During the thirty-three years that have passed since 1867, the attachment to England and her institutions has gained in strength, and it is clear that those predictions of Englishmen to which we have referred are completely falsified.  On the contrary, the dominant sentiment is for strengthening the ties that have in some respects become weak in consequence of the enlargement of the political rights of the Dominion, which has assumed the position of a semi-independent power, since England now only retains her imperial sovereignty by declaring peace or war with foreign nations, by appointing a governor-general, by controlling colonial legislation through the Queen in council and the Queen in parliament—­but not so as to diminish the rights of local self-government conceded to the Dominion—­and by requiring that all treaties with foreign nations should be made through her own government, while recognising the right of the dependency to be consulted and directly represented on all occasions when its interests are immediately affected.

In no respect have the Canadians followed the example of the United States, and made their executive entirely separate from the legislative authority.  On the contrary, there is no institution which works more admirably in the federation—­in the general as well as provincial governments—­than the principle of making the ministry responsible to the popular branch of the legislature, and in that way keeping the executive and legislative departments in harmony with each other, and preventing that conflict of authorities which is a distinguishing feature of the very opposite system that prevails in the federal republic.  If we review the amendments made of late years in the political constitutions of the States, and especially those ratified not long since in New York, we see in how many respects the Canadian system of government is superior to that of the republic.  For instance, Canada has enjoyed for years, as results of responsible government, the secret ballot, stringent laws against bribery and corruption at all classes of elections, the registration of voters, strict naturalisation laws, infrequent political elections, separation of municipal from provincial or national contests, appointive and permanent officials in every branch of the civil service, a carefully devised code of private bill legislation, the printing of all public as well as private bills before their consideration by the legislative bodies; and yet all these essentials of safe administration and legislation are now only in part introduced by constitutional enactment in so powerful and progressive a state as New York.