The Fauchet letter, therefore, although its revelations astounded and grieved him, had no effect upon his action, which would have been the same in any event; for he had said over and over again that he had not changed his first opinion.  In the letter to Randolph, just quoted, he also said:  “And finally you know the grounds on which my ultimate decision was taken, as the same were expressed to you, the other secretaries of departments, and the late attorney-general, after a thorough investigation of the subject in all the aspects in which it could be placed.”  As the Fauchet letter was not disclosed to Randolph until after the treaty had been signed, it was impossible that it should have been one of the grounds of the President’s decision, for Washington said to him, “You knew the grounds.”  If we are to suppose that the Fauchet letter had anything to do with the ratification so far as the President himself was concerned, we must, in the face of this letter, set Washington down as a deliberate liar, which is so wholly impossible that it disposes at once of the theory that he was driven into signing by a clever British intrigue.

Here as elsewhere the simple and obvious explanation is the true one, although the whole matter is sufficiently plain on the mere narration of facts.  The treaty was a great public question, to be decided on its merits, and the only new point raised by the Fauchet dispatch was how to deal with Randolph himself at this particular juncture.  To have shown the letter to him at once would have been to break the cabinet, with the treaty unsigned.  It would have resulted in much delay, extending to weeks, unless the President was ready to have an acting secretary sign both treaty and memorial; and it would have added during the continued suspense a fresh subject of excitement to the popular mind.  Washington’s duty plainly was to carry out his policy and bring the matter to an immediate conclusion, and, as was his custom, he did his duty.  If, as Mr. Conway thinks, the Fauchet letter was what compelled the ratification, Washington would have given it to the world at once, and then, having by this means discredited the opposition and roused a feeling against the French, would have signed the treaty.  England, of course, had taken advantage of this letter, and equally of course her minister and his influence were against Randolph, who was thought to be unfriendly.  Hammond intrigued with our public men just as all the French ministers did.  It is humiliating that such should have been the case, but it was due to our recent escape from a colonial condition, and to the way in which we allowed our politics to turn on foreign affairs.  Having made up his mind to ratify and end the question, Washington very properly kept silence as to the Fauchet letter until the work was done.  To do this, it was necessary of course that he should make no change in his personal attitude toward Randolph, nor was he obliged to do so, for he was too just a