Howe was resolved that his campaign should not be utterly fruitless, and therefore directed his attention to the defenses of the Hudson, and here he met with better success.  Congress, in its military wisdom, had insisted that these forts must and could be held.  So thought the generals, and so most especially, and most unluckily, did Greene.  Washington, with his usual accurate and keen perception, saw, from the time the men-of-war came up the Hudson, and, now that the British army was free, more clearly than ever, that both forts ought to be abandoned.  Sure of his ground, he overruled Congress, but was so far influenced by Greene that he gave to that officer discretionary orders as to withdrawal.  This was an act of weakness, as he afterwards admitted, for which he bitterly reproached himself, never confusing or glossing over his own errors, but loyal there, as elsewhere, to facts.  An attempt was made to hold both forts, and both were lost, as he had foreseen.  From Fort Lee the garrison withdrew in safety.  Fort Washington, with its plans all in Howe’s hands through the treachery of William Demont, the adjutant of Colonel Magaw, was carried by storm, after a severe struggle.  Twenty-six hundred men and all the munitions of war fell into the hands of the enemy.  It was a serious and most depressing loss, and was felt throughout the continent.

Meantime Washington had crossed info the Jerseys, and, after the loss of Fort Lee, began to retreat before the British, who, flushed with victory, now advanced rapidly under Lord Cornwallis.  The crisis of his fate and of the Revolution was upon him.  His army was melting away.  The militia had almost all disappeared, and regiments whose term of enlistment had expired were departing daily.  Lee, who had a division under his command, was ordered to come up, but paid no attention, although the orders were repeated almost every day for a month.  He lingered, and loitered, and excused himself, and at last was taken prisoner.  This disposed of him for a time very satisfactorily, but meanwhile he had succeeded in keeping his troops from Washington, which was a most serious misfortune.

On December 2 Washington was at Princeton with three thousand ragged men, and the British close upon his heels.  They had him now surely in their grip.  There could be no mistake this time, and there was therefore no need of a forced march.  But they had not yet learned that to Washington even hours meant much, and when, after duly resting, they reached the Delaware, they found the Americans on the other side, and all the boats destroyed for a distance of seventy miles.