most valuable possessions.  The sprawling British campaign of maraud and plunder, so bad in a military point of view, and about to prove fatal to Cornwallis, would, in case of sudden cessation of hostilities, be capable of the worst construction.  Time, therefore, had become of the last importance.  The decisive blow must be given at once, and before the slow political movements could come to a head.  On July 14, Washington had his plan mapped out.  He wrote in his diary:—­

“Matters having now come to a crisis, and a decided plan to be determined on, I was obliged—­from the shortness of Count De Grasse’s promised stay on this coast, the apparent disinclination of their naval officers to force the harbor of New York, and the feeble compliance of the States with my requisitions for men hitherto, and the little prospect of greater exertions in future—­to give up all ideas of attacking New York, and instead thereof to remove the French troops and a detachment from the American army to the Head of Elk, to be transported to Virginia for the purpose of cooeperating with the force from the West Indies against the troops in that State.”

Like most of Washington’s plans, this one was clear-cut and direct, and looks now simple enough, but at the moment it was hedged with almost inconceivable difficulties at every step.  The ever-present and ever-growing obstacles at home were there as usual.  Appeals to Morris for money were met by the most discouraging responses, and the States seemed more lethargic than ever.  Neither men nor supplies could be obtained; neither transportation nor provision for the march could be promised.  Then, too, in addition to all this, came a wholly new set of stumbling-blocks arising among the allies.  Everything hinged on the naval force.  Washington needed it for a short time only; but for that crucial moment he must have not only superiority but supremacy at sea.  Every French ship that could be reached must be in the Chesapeake, and Washington had had too many French fleets slip away from him at the last moment and bring everything to naught to take any chances in this direction.  To bring about his naval supremacy required the utmost tact and good management, and that he succeeded is one of the chief triumphs of the campaign.  In fact, at the very outset he was threatened in this quarter with a serious defection.  De Barras, with the squadron of the American station, was at Boston, and it was essential that he should be united with De Grasse at Yorktown.  But De Barras was nettled by the favoritism which had made De Grasse, his junior in service, his superior in command.  He determined therefore to take advantage of his orders and sail away to the north to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, and leave De Grasse to fight it out alone.  It is a hard thing to beat an opposing army, but it is equally hard to bring human jealousies and ambitions into the narrow path of self-sacrifice and subordination.  Alarmed beyond measure at the suggested departure