counsel strictly to himself, and set to work to threaten, and if possible to attack, New York, not with much hope of succeeding in any such attempt, but with a view of frightening Clinton and of inducing him either to withdraw troops from Virginia, or at least to withhold reinforcements.  As he began his Virginian campaign in this distant and remote fashion at the mouth of the Hudson, he was cheered by news that De Grasse, the French admiral, had sent recruits to Newport, and intended to come himself to the American coast.  He at once wrote De Grasse not to determine absolutely to come to New York, hinting that it might prove more advisable to operate to the southward.  It required great tact to keep the French fleet where he needed it, and yet not reveal his intentions, and nothing showed Washington’s foresight more plainly than the manner in which he made the moves in this campaign, when miles of space and weeks of time separated him from the final object of his plans.  To trace this mastery of details, and the skill with which every point was remembered and covered, would require a long and minute narrative.  They can only be indicated here sufficiently to show how exactly each movement fitted in its place, and how all together brought the great result.

Fortified by the good news from De Grasse, Washington had an interview with De Rochambeau, and effected a junction with the French army.  Thus strengthened, he opened his campaign against Cornwallis by beginning a movement against Clinton.  The troops were massed above the city, and an effort was made to surprise the upper posts and destroy Delancey’s partisan corps.  The attempt, although well planned, failed of its immediate purpose, giving Washington opportunity only for an effective reconnoissance of the enemy’s positions.  But the move was perfectly successful in its real and indirect object.  Clinton was alarmed.  He began to write to Cornwallis that troops should be returned to New York, and he gave up absolutely the idea of sending more men to Virginia.  Having thus convinced Clinton that New York was menaced, Washington then set to work to familiarize skillfully the minds of his allies and of Congress with the idea of a southern campaign.  With this end in view, he wrote on August 2 that, if more troops arrived from Virginia, New York would be impracticable, and that the next point was the south.  The only contingency, as he set forth, was the all-important one of obtaining naval superiority.  August 15 this essential condition gave promise of fulfillment, for on that day definite news arrived that De Grasse with his fleet was on his way to the Chesapeake.  Without a moment’s hesitation, Washington began to move, and at the same time he sent an urgent letter to the New England governors, demanding troops with an earnestness which he had never surpassed.