the scale.  Men of this description would be unwilling to suppose France capable of acting so ungenerous a part.  I am heartily disposed to entertain the most favorable sentiments of our new ally, and to cherish them in others to a reasonable degree.  But it is a maxim, founded on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation is to be trusted farther than it is bound by its own interest; and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it.  In our circumstances we ought to be particularly cautious; for we have not yet attained sufficient vigor and maturity to recover from the shock of any false steps into which we may unwarily fall.”

We shall have occasion to recall these utterances at a later day, but at this time they serve to show yet again how broadly and clearly Washington judged nations and policies.  Uppermost in his mind was the destiny of his own nation, just coming into being, and from that firm point he watched and reasoned.  His words had no effect on Congress, but as it turned out, the plan failed through adverse influences in the quarter where Washington least expected them.  He believed that this Canadian plan had been put into Lafayette’s mind by the cabinet of Louis XVI., and he could not imagine that a policy of such obvious wisdom could be overlooked by French statesmen.  In this he was completely mistaken, for France failed to see what seemed so simple to the American general, that the opportunity had come to revive her old American policy and reestablish her colonies under the most favorable conditions.  The ministers of Louis XVI., moreover, did not wish the colonies to conquer Canada, and the plan of Lafayette and the Congress received no aid in Paris and came to nothing.  But the fruitless incident exhibits in the strongest light the attitude of Washington as a purely American statesman, and the comprehensiveness of his mind in dealing with large affairs.

The French alliance and the coming of the French fleet were of incalculable advantage to the colonies, but they had one evil effect, as has already been suggested.  To a people weary with unequal conflict, it was a debilitating influence, and America needed at that moment more than ever energy and vigor, both in the council and the field.  Yet the general outlook was distinctly better and more encouraging.  Soon after Washington had defeated Clinton at Monmouth, and had taken a position whence he could watch and check him, he wrote to his friend General Nelson in Virginia:—­

“It is not a little pleasing, nor less wonderful to contemplate, that, after two years’ manoeuvring and undergoing the strangest vicissitudes that perhaps ever attended any one contest since the creation, both armies are brought back to the very point they set out from, and that the offending party at the beginning is now reduced to the spade and pickaxe for defense.  The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous in all this that he must be worse than an infidel that lacks faith, and more than wicked that has not gratitude enough to acknowledge his obligations.  But it will be time enough for me to turn preacher when my present appointment ceases.”