Washington determined to bring on a battle.  He was thwarted at the outset by his officers, as was wont to be the case.  Lee had returned more whimsical than ever, and at the moment was strongly adverse to an attack, and was full of wise saws about building a bridge of gold for the flying enemy.  The ascendancy which, as an English officer, he still retained enabled him to get a certain following, and the councils of war which were held compared unfavorably, as Hamilton put it, with the deliberations of midwives.  Washington was harassed of course by all this, but he did not stay his purpose, and as soon as he knew that Clinton actually had marched, he broke camp at Valley Forge and started in pursuit.  There were more councils of an old-womanish character, but finally Washington took the matter into his own hands, and ordered forth a strong detachment to attack the British rear-guard.  They set out on the 25th, and as Lee, to whom the command belonged, did not care to go, Lafayette was put in charge.  As soon as Lafayette had departed, however, Lee changed his mind, and insisted that all the detachments in front, amounting to five thousand men, formed a division so large that it was unjust not to give him the command.  Washington, therefore, sent him forward next day with two additional brigades, and then Lee by seniority took command on the 27th of the entire advance.

[Footnote 1:  The authorities are hopelessly conflicting as to the numbers on both sides.  The British returns on March 26 showed over 19,000 men.  They had since that date been weakened by desertions, but to what extent we can only conjecture.  The detachments to Florida and the West Indies ordered from England do not appear to have taken place.  The estimate of 16,000 to 17,000 seems the most reasonable.  Washington returned his rank and file as just over 10,000, which would indicate a total force of 13,000 to 14,000, possibly more.  Washington clearly underestimated the enemy, and the best conclusion seems to be that they were nearly matched in numbers, with a slight inferiority on the American side.]

In the evening of that day, Washington came up, reconnoitred the enemy, and saw that, although their position was a strong one, another day’s unmolested march would make it still stronger.  He therefore resolved to attack the next morning, and gave Lee then and there explicit orders to that effect.  In the early dawn he dispatched similar orders, but Lee apparently did nothing except move feebly forward, saying to Lafayette, “You don’t know the British soldiers; we cannot stand against them.”  He made a weak attempt to cut off a covering party, marched and countermarched, ordered and countermanded, until Lafayette and Wayne, eager to fight, knew not what to do, and sent hot messages to Washington to come to them.