The loss of the forts appalled the country and disappointed Washington, but did not shake his nerve for an instant.  He wrote to Schuyler:  “This stroke is severe indeed, and has distressed us much.  But notwithstanding things at present have a dark and gloomy aspect, I hope a spirited opposition will check the progress of General Burgoyne’s army, and that the confidence derived from his success will hurry him into measures that will, in their consequences, be favorable to us.  We should never despair; our situation has before been unpromising, and has changed for the better; so I trust it will again.  If new difficulties arise we must only put forth new exertions, and proportion our efforts to the exigency of the times.”  Even after this seemingly crushing defeat he still felt sure of Burgoyne, so long as he was unsupported.  Suiting the action to the word, he again bent every nerve to rouse New England and get out her militia.  When he was satisfied that Howe was landing below Philadelphia, the first thing he did was to send forth the same cry in the same quarter, to bring out more men against Burgoyne.  He showed, too, the utmost generosity toward the northern army, sending thither all the troops he could possibly spare, and even parting with his favorite corps of Morgan’s riflemen.  Despite his liberality, the commanders in the north were unreasonable in their demands, and when they asked too much, Washington flatly declined to send more men, for he would not weaken himself unduly, and he knew what they did not see, that the fate of the northern invasion turned largely on his own ability to cope with Howe.

The blame for the loss of the forts fell of course upon Schuyler, who was none too popular in Congress, and who with St. Clair was accordingly made a scape-goat.  Congress voted that Washington should appoint a new commander, and the New England delegates visited him to urge the selection of Gates.  This task Washington refused to perform, alleging as a reason that the northern department had always been considered a separate command, and that he had never done more than advise.  These reasons do not look very weighty or very strong, and it is not quite clear what the underlying motive was.  Washington never shrank from responsibility, and he knew very well that he could pick out the best man more unerringly than Congress.  But he also saw that Congress favored Gates, whom he would not have chosen, and he therefore probably felt that it was more important to have some one whom New England believed in and approved than a better soldier who would have been unwelcome to her representatives.  It is certain that he would not have acted thus, had he thought that generalship was an important element in the problem; but he relied on a popular uprising, and not on the commander, to defeat Burgoyne.  He may have thought, too, that it was a mistake to relieve Schuyler, who was working in the directions which he had pointed out, and who, if not a great soldier, was a brave, high-minded, and sensible man, devoted to his chief and to the country.  It was Schuyler indeed who, by his persistent labor in breaking down bridges, tearing up roads, and felling trees, while he gathered men industriously in all directions, did more than any one else at that moment to prepare the way for an ultimate victory.