The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803 — Volume 04 of 55 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 298 pages of information about The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803 — Volume 04 of 55.

The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803 — Volume 04 of 55 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 298 pages of information about The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803 — Volume 04 of 55.

28.  After this retreat, they encamped near the enemy, on the islet formed by the river, which runs north and south.  The enemy were on the northern side and the Spaniards on the southern.  It was a good thing to have located so near the enemy, if they had immediately made a defense for the artillery, which could have been done with stakes and earth.  That should have been done before it was established there; but they took up their position before they had made the bulwark.

29.  By this time the corsair had regained his courage, and ordered certain of his guns fired at the camp.  The “Vigilantib,” which had been captured from the galley, as abovesaid, shattered the leg of a standard-bearer of the master-of-camp, striking him in the middle of the shin-bone.  This man was healed, and is now living.  This catastrophe caused such an impression, that they resolved to move the camp from the island to the mainland, so that the river might intervene between them and the spot occupied by the corsair.  It was a great mistake followed by still greater ones.  The affair became a long siege, and they amused themselves in gambling freely, in levying tribute, and in other like things.

30.  The corsair was not expecting an assault by the Spaniards, so his fort was not completed, lacking the terreplein; and his artillery was unmounted, and no sentinels were placed.  He had made no preparations for war, beyond what a colonist might do.  But now he hurried to make preparations and to defend his cause.  He sent out squadrons from time to time with lances and arquebuses to fight—­although he himself did not leave the fort for the battle, but from within gave his signals of retreat or attack.

31.  The master-of-camp only made some ambuscades, prolonging the siege.  It is certain that the Spaniards never fought the Chinese with all their men, force to force.  Although the Chinese leader sent out five hundred or six hundred men, who pretended to show fight, they generally fled when fifty of the Spaniards came out.  It is certain that, force to force, the Chinese would not wait to fight; and if by the help of God they remained they would be routed, although they had three times as many men, for they are not a warlike race.  It is also certain, and all acknowledge it to be true, that the Spaniards desired to fight hand to hand, and to make the assault.  They always did their duty, fighting like valiant men, although there were some cowardly ones, as all bodies have their weak side.

32.  On account of the space given to the corsair, the latter was able to delay things and to do some damage.  For instance some soldiers were imprudently sent to form some small ambuscades; but the Chinese were warned of them, and made a counter ambuscade.  Of the seven soldiers who left the camp, the Chinese killed and captured five, and the other two fled.  It was exceedingly foolhardy to send so few men out in a case like this, and caused great harm, for it made the Chinese more daring.  The master-of-camp left camp with about twenty men to form another ambuscade, contrary to the advice of the captains.  This also proved unsuccessful, although, as help came, the Chinese retired without doing any damage.

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The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803 — Volume 04 of 55 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.