The question has often been raised whether thought is possible without speech; further, if speech and thought be not but two facets of the same psychic process.  The question is all the more difficult because it has been hedged about by misunderstandings.  In the first place, it is well to observe that whether or not thought necessitates symbolism, that is speech, the flow of language itself is not always indicative of thought.  We have seen that the typical linguistic element labels a concept.  It does not follow from this that the use to which language is put is always or even mainly conceptual.  We are not in ordinary life so much concerned with concepts as such as with concrete particularities and specific relations.  When I say, for instance, “I had a good breakfast this morning,” it is clear that I am not in the throes of laborious thought, that what I have to transmit is hardly more than a pleasurable memory symbolically rendered in the grooves of habitual expression.  Each element in the sentence defines a separate concept or conceptual relation or both combined, but the sentence as a whole has no conceptual significance whatever.  It is somewhat as though a dynamo capable of generating enough power to run an elevator were operated almost exclusively to feed an electric door-bell.  The parallel is more suggestive than at first sight appears.  Language may be looked upon as an instrument capable of running a gamut of psychic uses.  Its flow not only parallels that of the inner content of consciousness, but parallels it on different levels, ranging from the state of mind that is dominated by particular images to that in which abstract concepts and their relations are alone at the focus of attention and which is ordinarily termed reasoning.  Thus the outward form only of language is constant; its inner meaning, its psychic value or intensity, varies freely with attention or the selective interest of the mind, also, needless to say, with the mind’s general development.  From the point of view of language, thought may be defined as the highest latent or potential content of speech, the content that is obtained by interpreting each of the elements in the flow of language as possessed of its very fullest conceptual value.  From this it follows at once that language and thought are not strictly coterminous.  At best language can but be the outward facet of thought on the highest, most generalized, level of symbolic expression.  To put our viewpoint somewhat differently, language is primarily a pre-rational function.  It humbly works up to the thought that is latent in, that may eventually be read into, its classifications and its forms; it is not, as is generally but naively assumed, the final label put upon, the finished thought.