A leading subject in Mr. Huelsemann’s note is that of the correspondence between Mr. Huelsemann and the predecessor of the undersigned, in which Mr. Clayton, by direction of the President, informed Mr Huelsemann “that Mr. Mann’s mission had no other object in view than to obtain reliable information as to the true state of affairs in Hungary, by personal observation.”  Mr. Huelsemann remarks, that “this explanation can hardly be admitted, for it says very little as to the cause of the anxiety which was felt to ascertain the chances of the revolutionists.”  As this, however, is the only purpose which can, with any appearance of truth, be attributed to the agency; as nothing whatever is alleged by Mr. Huelsemann to have been either done or said by the agent inconsistent with such an object, the undersigned conceives that Mr. Clayton’s explanation ought to be deemed, not only admissible, but quite satisfactory.

Mr. Huelsemann states, in the course of his note, that his instructions to address his present communication to Mr. Clayton reached Washington about the time of the lamented death of the late President, and that he delayed from a sense of propriety the execution of his task until the new administration should be fully organized; “a delay which he now rejoices at, as it has given him the opportunity of ascertaining from the new President himself, on the occasion of the reception of the diplomatic corps, that the fundamental policy of the United States, so frequently proclaimed, would guide the relations of the American government with other powers.”  Mr. Huelsemann also observes, that it is in his power to assure the undersigned “that the Imperial government is disposed to cultivate relations of friendship and good understanding with the United States.”

The President receives this assurance of the disposition of the Imperial government with great satisfaction; and, in consideration of the friendly relations of the two governments thus mutually recognized, and of the peculiar nature of the incidents by which their good understanding is supposed by Mr. Huelsemann to have been for a moment disturbed or endangered, the President regrets that Mr. Huelsemann did not feel himself at liberty wholly to forbear from the execution of instructions, which were of course transmitted from Vienna without any foresight of the state of things under which they would reach Washington.  If Mr. Huelsemann saw, in the address of the President to the diplomatic corps, satisfactory pledges of the sentiments and the policy of this government in regard to neutral rights and neutral duties, it might, perhaps, have been better not to bring on a discussion of past transactions.  But the undersigned readily admits that this was a question fit only for the consideration and decision of Mr. Huelsemann himself; and although the President does not see that any good purpose can be answered by reopening the inquiry into the propriety of the steps taken by President Taylor to ascertain the probable issue of the late civil war in Hungary, justice to his memory requires the undersigned briefly to restate the history of those steps, and to show their consistency with the neutral policy which has invariably guided the government of the United States in its foreign relations, as well as with the established and well-settled principles of national intercourse, and the doctrines of public law.