It is not easy to perceive how these consequences can be admitted justly to flow from the fair exercise of a clear right.  If injury be produced by the exercise of a right, it would seem strange that it should be repaired, as if it had been the effect of a wrongful act.  The general rule of law certainly is, that, in the proper and prudent exercise of his own right, no one is answerable for undesigned injuries.  It may be said that the right is a qualified right; that it is a right to do certain acts of force at the risk of turning out to be wrong-doers, and of being made answerable for all damages.  But such an argument would prove every trespass to be matter of right, subject only to just responsibility.  If force were allowed to such reasoning in other cases, it would follow that an individual’s right in his own property was hardly more than a well-founded claim for compensation if he should be deprived of it.  But compensation is that which is rendered for injury, and is not commutation, or forced equivalent, for acknowledged rights.  It implies, at least in its general interpretation the commission of some wrongful act.

But, without pressing further these inquiries into the accuracy and propriety of definitions and the use of words, I proceed to draw your attention to the thing itself, and to consider what these acts are which the British government insists its cruisers have a right to perform, and to what consequences they naturally and necessarily tend.  An eminent member of the House of Commons[1] thus states the British claim, and his statement is acquiesced in and adopted by the first minister of the crown:—­

“The claim of this country is for the right of our cruisers to ascertain whether a merchant-vessel is justly entitled to the protection of the flag which she may happen to have hoisted, such vessel being in circumstances which rendered her liable to the suspicion, first, that she was not entitled to the protection of the flag; and, secondly, if not entitled to it, she was, either under the law of nations or the provisions of treaties, subject to the supervision and control of our cruisers.”

Now the question is, By what means is this ascertainment to be effected?

As we understand the general and settled rules of public law, in respect to ships of war sailing under the authority of their government, “to arrest pirates and other public offenders,” there is no reason why they may not approach any vessels descried at sea for the purpose of ascertaining their real characters.  Such a right of approach seems indispensable for the fair and discreet exercise of their authority; and the use of it cannot he justly deemed indicative of any design to insult or injure those they approach, or to impede them in their lawful commerce.  On the other hand, it is as clear that no ship is, under such circumstances, bound to lie by or wait the approach of any other ship.  She is at full liberty to