Now, the eye of this court must be directed to the proceedings of the general government, which had its attention called to the subject, and which did institute proceedings respecting it.  And the court will learn from the proceedings of the executive branch of the government, and of the two chambers above us, how the disturbances in Rhode Island were regarded; whether they were looked upon as the establishment of any government, or as a mere pure, unauthorized, unqualified insurrection against the authority of the existing government of the State.

I say, therefore, that, upon that ground, these facts are not facts which this court can inquire into, or which the court below could try; because they are facts going to prove (if they prove any thing) the establishment of a new sovereignty; and that is a question to be settled elsewhere and otherwise.  From the very nature of the case, it is not a question to be decided by judicial inquiry.  Take, for example, one of the points which it involves.  My adversary offered to prove that the constitution was adopted by a majority of the people of Rhode Island; by a large majority, as he alleges.  What does this offer call on your honors to do?  Why, to ascertain, by proof, what is the number of citizens of Rhode Island, and how many attended the meetings at which the delegates to the convention were elected; and then you have to add them all up, and prove by testimony the qualifications of every one of them to be an elector.  It is enough to state such a proposition to show its absurdity.  As none such ever was sustained in a court of law, so none can be or ought to be sustained.  Observe that minutes of proceedings can be no proof, for they were made by no authentic persons; registers were kept by no warranted officers; chairmen and moderators were chosen without authority.  In short, there are no official records; there is no testimony in the case but parol.  Chief Justice Durfee has stated this so plainly, that I need not dwell upon it.

But, again, I say you cannot look into the facts attempted to be proved, because of the certainty of the continuance of the old government till the new and legal constitution went into effect on the 3d of May, 1843.  To prove that there was another constitution of two days’ duration would be ridiculous.  And I say that the decision of Rhode Island herself, by her legislature, by her executive, by the adjudication of her highest court of law, on the trial of Dorr, has shut up the whole case.  Do you propose,—­I will not put it in that form,—­but would it be proper for this court to reverse that adjudication?  That declares that the judges of Rhode Island know nothing of the “People’s Constitution.”  Is it possible, then, for this court, or for the court below, to know any thing of it?

It appears to me that, if there were nothing else in the case, the proceedings of Rhode Island herself must close everybody’s mouth, in the court and out of it.  Rhode Island is competent to decide the question herself, and everybody else ought to be bound by her decision.  And she has decided it.