Now will any man, will my adversary here, on a moment’s reflection, undertake to show the least resemblance on earth between what I have called the American doctrine, and the doctrine of the sovereigns at Laybach?  What do I contend for?  I say that the will of the people must prevail, when it is ascertained; but there must be some legal and authentic mode of ascertaining that will; and then the people may make what government they please.  Was that the doctrine of Laybach?  Was not the doctrine there held this,—­that the sovereigns should say what changes shall be made?  Changes must proceed from them; new constitutions and new laws emanate from them; and all the people had to do was to submit.  That is what they maintained.  All changes began with the sovereigns, and ended with the sovereigns.  Pray, at about the time that the Congress of Laybach was in session, did the allied powers put it to the people of Italy to say what sort of change they would have?  And at a more recent date, did they ask the citizens of Cracow what change they would have in their constitution?  Or did they take away their constitution, laws, and liberties, by their own sovereign act?  All that is necessary here is, that the will of the people should be ascertained, by some regular rule of proceeding, prescribed by previous law.  But when ascertained, that will is as sovereign as the will of a despotic prince, of the Czar of Muscovy, or the Emperor of Austria himself, though not quite so easily made known.  A ukase or an edict signifies at once the will of a despotic prince; but that will of the people, which is here as sovereign as the will of such a prince, is not so quickly ascertained or known; and thence arises the necessity for suffrage, which is the mode whereby each man’s power is made to tell upon the constitution of the government, and in the enactment of laws.

One of the most recent laws for taking the will of the people in any State is the law of 1845, of the State of New York.  It begins by recommending to the people to assemble in their several election districts, and proceed to vote for delegates to a convention.  If you will take the pains to read that act, it will be seen that New York regarded it as an ordinary exercise of legislative power.  It applies all the penalties for fraudulent voting, as in other elections.  It punishes false oaths, as in other cases.  Certificates of the proper officers were to be held conclusive, and the will of the people was, in this respect, collected essentially in the same manner, supervised by the same officers, under the same guards against force and fraud, collusion and misrepresentation, as are usual in voting for State or United States officers.

We see, therefore, from the commencement of the government under which we live, down to this late act of the State of New York, one uniform current of law, of precedent, and of practice, all going to establish the point that changes in government are to be brought about by the will of the people, assembled under such legislative provisions as may be necessary to ascertain that will, truly and authentically.