The first case was argued by Mr. Hallet and Mr. Clifford (Attorney-General) for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Whipple and Mr. Webster for the defendants in error.  Mr. Justice Catron, Mr. Justice Daniel, and Mr. Justice McKinley were absent from the court, in consequence of ill health.  Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court, affirming the judgment of the court below in the first case, and dismissing the second for want of jurisdiction.  Mr. Justice Woodbury dissented, and delivered a very elaborate opinion in support of his view of the subject.]

There is something novel and extraordinary in the case now before the court.  All will admit that it is not such a one as is usually presented for judicial consideration.

It is well known, that in the years 1841 and 1842 political agitation existed in Rhode Island.  Some of the citizens of that State undertook to form a new constitution of government, beginning their proceedings towards that end by meetings of the people, held without authority of law, and conducting those proceedings through such forms as led them, in 1842, to say that they had established a new constitution and form of government, and placed Mr. Thomas W. Dorr at its head.  The previously existing, and then existing, government of Rhode Island treated these proceedings as nugatory, so far as they went to establish a new constitution; and criminal, so far as they proposed to confer authority upon any persons to interfere with the acts of the existing government, or to exercise powers of legislation, or administration of the laws.  All will remember that the state of things approached, if not actual conflict between men in arms, at least the “perilous edge of battle.”  Arms were resorted to, force was used, and greater force threatened.  In June, 1842, this agitation subsided.  The new government, as it called itself, disappeared from the scene of action.  The former government, the Charter government, as it was sometimes styled, resumed undisputed control, went on in its ordinary course, and the peace of the State was restored.

But the past had been too serious to be forgotten.  The legislature of the State had, at an early stage of the troubles, found it necessary to pass special laws for the punishment of the persons concerned in these proceedings.  It defined the crime of treason, as well as smaller offences, and authorized the declaration of martial law.  Governor King, under this authority, proclaimed the existence of treason and rebellion in the State, and declared the State under martial law.  This having been done, and the ephemeral government of Mr. Dorr having disappeared, the grand juries of the State found indictments against several persons for having disturbed the peace of the State, and one against Dorr himself for treason.  This indictment came on in the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in 1844, before a tribunal admitted on all hands to be the legal judicature of the State.  He was tried by a jury of Rhode Island, above all objection, and after all challenge.  By that jury, under the instructions of the court, he was convicted of treason, and sentenced to imprisonment for life.