safety or high public interest.  It may be very possible that good intentions do really sometimes exist when constitutional restraints are disregarded.  There are men, in all ages, who mean to exercise power usefully; but who mean to exercise it.  They mean to govern well; but they mean to govern.  They promise to be kind masters; but they mean to be masters.  They think there need be but little restraint upon themselves.  Their notion of the public interest is apt to be quite closely connected with their own exercise of authority.  They may not, indeed, always understand their own motives.  The love of power may sink too deep in their own hearts even for their own scrutiny, and may pass with themselves for mere patriotism and benevolence.

A character has been drawn of a very eminent citizen of Massachusetts, of the last age, which, though I think it does not entirely belong to him, yet very well describes a certain class of public men.  It was said of this distinguished son of Massachusetts, that in matters of politics and government he cherished the most kind and benevolent feelings towards the whole earth.  He earnestly desired to see all nations well governed; and to bring about this happy result, he wished that the United States might govern the rest of the world; that Massachusetts might govern the United States; that Boston might govern Massachusetts; and as for himself, his own humble ambition would be satisfied by governing the little town of Boston.

I do not intend, Gentlemen, to commit so unreasonable a trespass on your patience as to discuss all those cases in which I think executive power has been unreasonably extended.  I shall only allude to some of them, and, as being earliest in the order of time, and hardly second to any other in importance, I mention the practice of removal from all offices, high and low, for opinion’s sake, and on the avowed ground of giving patronage to the President; that is to say, of giving him the power of influencing men’s political opinions and political conduct, by hopes and by fears addressed directly to their pecuniary interests.  The great battle on this point was fought, and was lost, in the Senate of the United States, in the last session of Congress under Mr. Adams’s administration.  After General Jackson was known to be elected, and before his term of office began, many important offices became vacant by the usual causes of death and resignation.  Mr. Adams, of course, nominated persons to fill these vacant offices.  But a majority of the Senate was composed of the friends of General Jackson; and, instead of acting on these nominations, and filling the vacant offices with ordinary promptitude, the nominations were postponed to a day beyond the 4th of March, for the purpose, openly avowed, of giving the patronage of the appointments to the President who was then coming into office.  When the new President entered on his office, he withdrew these nominations, and sent in nominations of his own friends