Certainly, Sir, certainly I was not, on that account, the more inclined to concur.  It was no argument with me, that others seemed to be rushing, with such heedless, headlong trust, such impetuosity of confidence, into the arms of executive power.  I held back the more strongly, and would hold back the longer.  I see, or I think I see,—­it is either a true vision of the future, revealed by the history of the past, or, if it be an illusion, it is an illusion which appears to me in all the brightness and sunlight of broad noon,—­that it is in this career of personal confidence, along this beaten track of man-worship, marked at every stage by the fragments of other free governments, that our own system is making progress to its close.  A personal popularity, honorably earned at first by military achievements, and sustained now by party, by patronage, and by enthusiasm which looks for no ill, because it means no ill itself, seems to render men willing to gratify power, even before its demands are made, and to surfeit executive discretion, even in anticipation of its own appetite.

If, Sir, on the 3d of March last, it had been the purpose of both houses of Congress to create a military dictator, what formula had been better suited to their purpose than this vote of the House?  It is true, we might have given more money, if we had had it to give.  We might have emptied the treasury; but as to the form of the gift, we could not have bettered it.  Rome had no better models.  When we give our money for any military purpose whatever, what remains to be done?  If we leave it with one man to decide, not only whether the military means of the country shall be used at all, but how they shall be used, and to what extent they shall be employed, what remains either for Congress or the people but to sit still and see how this dictatorial power will be exercised?  On the 3d of March, Sir, I had not forgotten, it was impossible that I should have forgotten, the recommendation in the message at the opening of that session, that power should be vested in the President to issue letters of marque and reprisal against France, at his discretion, in the recess of Congress.  Happily, this power was not granted; but suppose it had been, what would then have been the true condition of this government?  Why, Sir, this condition is very shortly described.  The whole war power would have been in the hands of the President; for no man can doubt a moment that reprisals would bring on immediate war; and the treasury, to the amount of this vote, in addition to all ordinary appropriations, would have been at his absolute disposal also.  And all this in a time of peace.  I beseech all true lovers of constitutional liberty to contemplate this state of things, and tell me whether such be a truly republican administration of this government.  Whether particular consequences had ensued or not, is such an accumulation of power in the hands of the executive according to the spirit of our system?  Is it either wise or safe?  Has it any warrant in the practice of former times?  Or are gentlemen ready to establish the practice, as an example for the benefit of those who are to come after us?