But, Sir, whether the decision of 1789 were right or wrong, the bill before us applies to the actually existing state of things.  It recognizes the President’s power of removal, in express terms, as it has been practically exercised, independently of the Senate.  The present bill does not disturb the power; but I wish it not to be understood that the power is, even now, beyond the reach of legislation.  I believe it to be within the just power of Congress to reverse the decision of 1789, and I mean to hold myself at liberty to act, hereafter, upon that question, as I shall think the safety of the government and of the Constitution may require.  The present bill, however, proceeds upon the admission that the power does at present exist.  Its words are:—­

“Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That, in all nominations made by the President to the Senate, to fill vacancies occasioned by the exercise of the President’s power to remove the said officers mentioned in the second section of this act, the fact of the removal shall be stated to the Senate, at the same time that the nomination is made, with a statement of the reasons for which such officer may have been removed.”

In my opinion, this provision is entirely constitutional, and highly expedient.

The regulation of the tenure of office is a common exercise of legislative authority, and the power of Congress in this particular is not at all restrained or limited by any thing contained in the Constitution, except in regard to judicial officers.  All the rest is left to the ordinary discretion of the legislature.  Congress may give to offices which it creates (except those of judges) what duration it pleases.  When the office is created, and is to be filled, the President is to nominate the candidate to fill it; but when he comes into the office, he comes into it upon the conditions and restrictions which the law may have attached to it.  If Congress were to declare by law that the Attorney-General, or the Secretary of State, should hold his office during good behavior, I am not aware of any ground on which such a law could be held unconstitutional.  A provision of that kind in regard to such officers might be unwise, but I do not perceive that it would transcend the power of Congress.

If the Constitution had not prescribed the tenure of judicial office, Congress might have thought it expedient to give the judges just such a tenure as the Constitution has itself provided; that is to say, a right to hold during good behavior; and I am of opinion that such a law would have been perfectly constitutional.  It is by law, in England, that the judges are made independent of the removing power of the crown.  I do not think that the Constitution, by giving the power of appointment, or the power both of appointment and removal, to the President and Senate, intended to impose any restraint on the legislature, in regard to its authority of regulating the duties,