a given day, dispensed with.  These are usually cases in which the object is, not to inform the incumbent that he is removed, but to tell him that a successor either is, or by a day named will be, appointed.  If there be any instances in which such notice is given without express reference to the appointment of a successor, they are few; and even in these, such reference must be implied; because in no case is there any distinct official act of removal, that I can find, unconnected with the act of appointment.  At any rate, it is the usual practice, and has been from the first, to consider the appointment as producing the removal of the previous incumbent.  When the President desires to remove a person from office, he sends a message to the Senate nominating some other person.  The message usually runs in this form:  “I nominate A.B. to be collector of the customs, &c., in the place of C.D., removed.”  If the Senate advise and consent to this nomination, C.D. is effectually out of office, and A.B. is in, in his place.  The same effect would be produced, if the message should say nothing of any removal.  Suppose A.B. to be Secretary of State, and the President to send us a message, saying merely, “I nominate C.D. to be Secretary of State.”  If we confirm this nomination, C.D. becomes Secretary of State, and A.B. is necessarily removed.

I have gone into these details and particulars, Sir, for the purpose of showing, that, not only in the nature of things, but also according to the practice of the government, the power of removal is incident to the power of appointment.  It belongs to it, is attached to it, forms a part of it, or results from it.

If this be true, the inference is manifest.  If the power of removal, when not otherwise regulated by Constitution or law, be part and parcel of the power of appointment, or a necessary incident to it, then whoever holds the power of appointment holds also the power of removal.  But it is the President and the Senate, and not the President alone, who hold the power of appointment; and therefore, according to the true construction of the Constitution, it should be the President and Senate, and not the President alone, who hold the power of removal.

The decision of 1789 has been followed by a very strange and indefensible anomaly, showing that it does not rest on any just principle.  The natural connection between the appointing power and the removing power has, as I have already stated, always led the President to bring about a removal by the process of a new appointment.  This is quite efficient for his purpose, when the Senate confirms the new nomination.  One man is then turned out, and another put in.  But the Senate sometimes rejects the new nomination; and what then becomes of the old incumbent?  Is he out of office, or is he still in?  He has not been turned out by any exercise of the power of appointment, for no appointment has been made.  That power has not been exercised.  He has not been removed