power shall be vested in Congress constitutes, by itself, a grant of such power.  In the one case, as in the other, I think the object was to describe and denominate the department, which should hold, respectively, the legislative and the executive authority; very much as we see, in some of the State constitutions, that the several articles are headed with the titles “legislative power,” “executive power,” “judicial power”; and this entitling of the articles with the name of the power has never been supposed, of itself, to confer any authority whatever.  It amounts to no more than naming the departments.

If, then, the power of removal be admitted to be an executive power, still it must be sought for and found among the enumerated executive powers, or fairly implied from some one or more of them.  It cannot be implied from the general words.  The power of appointment was not left to be so implied; why, then, should the power of removal have been so left?  They are both closely connected; one is indispensable to the other; why, then, was one carefully expressed, defined, and limited, and not one word said about the other?  Sir, I think the whole matter is sufficiently plain.  Nothing is said in the Constitution about the power of removal, because it is not a separate and distinct power.  It is part of the power of appointment, naturally going with it or necessarily resulting from it.  The Constitution or the laws may separate these powers, it is true, in a particular case, as is done in respect to the judges, who, though appointed by the President and Senate, cannot be removed at the pleasure of either or of both.  So a statute, in prescribing the tenure of any other office, may place the officer beyond the reach of the appointing power.  But where no other tenure is prescribed, and officers hold their places at will, that will is necessarily the will of the appointing power; because the exercise of the power of appointment at once displaces such officers.  The power of placing one man in office necessarily implies the power of turning another out.  If one man be Secretary of State, and another be appointed, the first goes out by the mere force of the appointment of the other, without any previous act of removal whatever.  And this is the practice of the government, and has been, from the first.  In all the removals which have been made, they have generally been effected simply by making other appointments.  I cannot find a case to the contrary.  There is no such thing as any distinct official act of removal.  I have looked into the practice, and caused inquiries to be made in the departments, and I do not learn that any such proceeding is known as an entry or record of the removal of an officer from office; and the President could only act, in such cases, by causing some proper record or entry to be made, as proof of the fact of removal.  I am aware that there have been some cases in which notice has been sent to persons in office that their services are, or will be, after