is the provision of the bill.  It applies only to certain enumerated officers, who may be called accounting officers; that is to say, officers who receive and disburse the public money.  Formerly, all these officers held their places at the pleasure of the President.  If he saw no just cause for removing them, they continued in their situations, no fixed period being assigned for the expiration of their commissions.  But the act of 1820 limited the commissions of these officers to four years.  At the end of four years, they were to go out, without any removal, however well they might have conducted themselves, or however useful to the public their further continuance in office might be.  They might be nominated again, or might not; but their commissions expired.

Now, Sir, I freely admit that considerable benefit has arisen from this law.  I agree that it has, in some instances, secured promptitude, diligence, and a sense of responsibility.  These were the benefits which those who passed the law expected from it; and these benefits have, in some measure, been realized.  But I think that this change in the tenure of office, together with some good, has brought along a far more than equivalent amount of evil.  By the operation of this law, the President can deprive a man of office without taking the responsibility of removing him.  The law itself vacates the office, and gives the means of rewarding a friend without the exercise of the power of removal at all.  Here is increased power, with diminished responsibility.  Here is a still greater dependence, for the means of living, on executive favor, and, of course, a new dominion acquired over opinion and over conduct.  The power of removal is, or at least formerly was, a suspected and odious power.  Public opinion would not always tolerate it; and still less frequently did it approve it.  Something of character, something of the respect of the intelligent and patriotic part of the community, was lost by every instance of its unnecessary exercise.  This was some restraint.  But the law of 1820 took it all away.  It vacated offices periodically, by its own operation, and thus added to the power of removal, which it left still existing in full force, a new and extraordinary facility for the extension of patronage, influence, and favoritism.

I would ask every member of the Senate if he does not perceive, daily, effects which may be fairly traced to this cause.  Does he not see a union of purpose, a devotion to power, a co-operation in action, among all who hold office, quite unknown in the earlier periods of the government?  Does he not behold, every hour, a stronger development of the principle of personal attachment, and a corresponding diminution of genuine and generous public feeling?  Was indiscriminate support of party measures, was unwavering fealty, was regular suit and service, ever before esteemed such important and essential parts of official duty?