of the people, and with equal contempt the higher guardianship
of the people themselves,—who is he that
declares to us, through the President’s lips,
that the security for freedom rests in executive authority?
Who is he that belies the blood and libels the fame
of his own ancestors, by declaring that
they,
with solemnity of form, and force of manner, have
invoked the executive power to come to the protection
of liberty? Who is he that thus charges them with
the insanity, or the recklessness, of putting the
lamb beneath the lion’s paw? No, Sir.
No, Sir. Our security is in our watchfulness of
executive power. It was the constitution of this
department which was infinitely the most difficult
part in the great work of creating our present government.
To give to the executive department such power as should
make it useful, and yet not such as should render it
dangerous; to make it efficient, independent, and
strong, and yet to prevent it from sweeping away every
thing by its union of military and civil authority,
by the influence of patronage, and office, and favor,—this,
indeed, was difficult. They who had the work
to do saw the difficulty, and we see it; and if we
would maintain our system, we shall act wisely to that
end, by preserving every restraint and every guard
which the Constitution has provided. And when
we, and those who come after us, have done all that
we can do, and all that they can do, it will be well
for us and for them, if some popular executive, by
the power of patronage and party, and the power, too,
of that very popularity, shall not hereafter prove
an overmatch for all other branches of the government.
I do not wish, Sir, to impair the power of the President,
as it stands written down in the Constitution, and
as great and good men have hitherto exercised it.
In this, as in other respects, I am for the Constitution
as it is. But I will not acquiesce in the reversal
of all just ideas of government; I will not degrade
the character of popular representation; I will not
blindly confide, where all experience admonishes me
to be jealous; I will not trust executive power, vested
in the hands of a single magistrate, to be the guardian
of liberty.
Having claimed for the executive the especial guardianship
of the Constitution, the Protest proceeds to present
a summary view of the powers which are supposed to
be conferred on the executive by that instrument.
And it is to this part of the message, Sir, that I
would, more than to all others, call the particular
attention of the Senate. I confess that it was
only upon careful reperusal of the paper that I perceived
the extent to which its assertions of power reach.
I do not speak now of the President’s claims
of power as opposed to legislative authority, but
of his opinions as to his own authority, duty, and
responsibility, as connected with all other officers
under the government. He is of opinion that the
whole executive power is vested in him, and that he