because all such governments establish restraints, as well on the power of government itself as on that of individuals.  If we will abolish the distinction of branches, and have but one branch; if we will abolish jury trials, and leave all to the judge; if we will then ordain that the legislator shall himself be that judge; and if we will place the executive power in the same hands, we may readily simplify government.  We may easily bring it to the simplest of all possible forms, a pure despotism.  But a separation of departments, so far as practicable, and the preservation of clear lines of division between them, is the fundamental idea in the creation of all our constitutions; and, doubtless, the continuance of regulated liberty depends on maintaining these boundaries.

In the progress, Sir, of the governments of the United States, we seem exposed to two classes of dangers or disturbances; one external, the other internal.  It may happen that collisions arise between this government and the governments of the States.  That case belongs to the first class.  A memorable instance of this kind occurred last year.  It was my conscientious opinion, on that occasion, that the authority claimed by an individual State[2] was subversive of the just powers of this government, and, indeed, incompatible with its existence.  I gave a hearty co-operation, therefore, to measures which the crisis seemed to require.  We have now before us what appears, to my judgment, to be an instance of the latter kind.  A contest has arisen between different branches of the same government, interrupting their harmony, and threatening to disturb their balance.  It is of the highest importance, therefore, to examine the question carefully, and to decide it justly.

The separation of the powers of government into three departments, though all our constitutions profess to be founded on it, has, nevertheless, never been perfectly established in any government of the world, and perhaps never can be.  The general principle is of inestimable value, and the leading lines of distinction sufficiently plain; yet there are powers of so undecided a character, that they do not seem necessarily to range themselves under either head.  And most of our constitutions, too, having laid down the general principle, immediately create exceptions.  There do not exist, in the general science of government, or the received maxims of political law, such precise definitions as enable us always to say of a given power whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial.  And this is one reason, doubtless, why the Constitution, in conferring power on all the departments, proceeds not by general definition, but by specific enumeration.  And, again, it grants a power in general terms, but yet, in the same or some other article or section, imposes a limitation or qualification on the grant; and the grant and the limitation must, of course, be construed together.  Thus the Constitution says