right to fill vacancies in their own number.  This is now taken away.  They were to consist of twelve, and, by express provision, of no more.  This is altered.  They and their successors, appointed by themselves, were for ever to hold the property.  The legislature has found successors for them, before their seats are vacant.  The powers and privileges which the twelve were to exercise exclusively, are now to be exercised by others.  By one of the acts, they are subjected to heavy penalties if they exercise their offices, or any of those powers and privileges granted them by charter, and which they had exercised for fifty years.  They are to be punished for not accepting the new grant and taking its benefits.  This, it must be confessed, is rather a summary mode of settling a question of constitutional right.  Not only are new trustees forced into the corporation, but new trusts and uses are created.  The college is turned into a university.  Power is given to create new colleges, and, to authorize any diversion of the funds which may be agreeable to the new boards, sufficient latitude is given by the undefined power of establishing an institute.  To these new colleges, and this institute, the funds contributed by the founder, Dr. Wheelock, and by the original donors, the Earl of Dartmouth and others, are to be applied, in plain and manifest disregard of the uses to which they were given.

The president, one of the old trustees, had a right to his office, salary, and emoluments, subject to the twelve trustees alone.  His title to these is now changed, and he is made accountable to new masters.  So also all the professors and tutors.  If the legislature can at pleasure make these alterations and changes in the rights and privileges of the plaintiffs, it may, with equal propriety, abolish these rights and privileges altogether.  The same power which can do any part of this work can accomplish the whole.  And, indeed, the argument on which these acts have been hitherto defended goes altogether on the ground, that this is such a corporation as the legislature may abolish at pleasure; and that its members have no rights, liberties, franchises, property, or privileges, which the legislature may not revoke, annul, alienate, or transfer to others, whenever it sees fit.

It will be contended by the plaintiffs, that these acts are not valid and binding on them without their assent,—­

1.  Because they are against common right, and the Constitution of New Hampshire.

2.  Because they are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.

I am aware of the limits which bound the jurisdiction of the court in this case, and that on this record nothing can be decided but the single question, whether these acts are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.  Yet it may assist in forming an opinion of their true nature and character to compare them with those fundamental principles introduced into the State governments for the purpose of limiting the exercise of the legislative power, and which the Constitution of New Hampshire expresses with great fulness and accuracy.