such.  This, says the historian, so enraged his Majesty, that he sent for the journal, had it brought into the Council, and there, in the presence of his lords and great officers of state, tore out the offensive resolution with his own royal hand.  He then dissolved Parliament, and sent its most refractory members to the Tower.  I have no fear, certainly, Sir, that this English example will be followed, on this occasion, to its full extent; nor would I insinuate that any thing outrageous has been thought of, or intended, except outrageous pretensions; but such pretensions I must impute to the author of this Protest, whoever that author may be.

When this and the other house shall lose the freedom of speech and debate; when they shall surrender the rights of publicly and freely canvassing all important measures of the executive; when they shall not be allowed to maintain their own authority and their own privileges by vote, declaration, or resolution,—­they will then be no longer free representatives of a free people, but slaves themselves, and fit instruments to make slaves of others.

The Protest, Mr. President, concedes what it doubtless regards as a liberal right of discussion to the people themselves.  But its language, even in acknowledging this right of the people to discuss the conduct of their servants, is qualified and peculiar.  The free people of the United States, it declares, have an undoubted right to discuss the official conduct of the President in such language and form as they may think proper, “subject only to the restraints of truth and justice.”  But, then, who is to be judge of this truth and justice?  Are the people to judge for themselves, or are others to judge for them?  The Protest is here speaking of political rights, and not moral rights; and if restraints are imposed on political rights, it must follow, of course, that others are to decide whenever the case arises whether these restraints have been violated.  It is strange that the writer of the Protest did not perceive that, by using this language, he was pushing the President into a direct avowal of the doctrines of 1798.  The text of the Protest and the text of the obnoxious act[1] of that year are nearly identical.

But, Sir, if the people have a right to discuss the official conduct of the executive, so have their representatives.  We have been taught to regard a representative of the people as a sentinel on the watch-tower of liberty.  Is he to be blind, though visible danger approaches?  Is he to be deaf, though sounds of peril fill the air?  Is he to be dumb, while a thousand duties impel him to raise the cry of alarm?  Is he not, rather, to catch the lowest whisper which breathes intention or purpose of encroachment on the public liberties, and to give his voice breath and utterance at the first appearance of danger?  Is not his eye to traverse the whole horizon with the keen and eager vision of an unhooded hawk, detecting, through