But the case before us is not a case of merely theoretic infringement; nor is it one of trifling importance.  Far otherwise.  It respects one of the highest and most important of all the powers of government; that is to say, the custody and control of the public money.  The act of removing the deposits, which I now consider as the President’s act, and which his friends on this floor defend as his act, took the national purse from beneath the security and guardianship of the law, and disposed of its contents, in parcels, in such places of deposit as he chose to select.  At this very moment, every dollar of the public treasure is subject, so far as respects its custody and safe-keeping, to his unlimited control.  We know not where it is to-day; still less do we know where it may be to-morrow.

But, Mr. President, this is not all.  There is another part of the case, which has not been so much discussed, but which appears to me to be still more indefensible in its character.  It is something which may well teach us the tendency of power to move forward with accelerated pace, if it be allowed to take the first step.  The Bank of the United States, in addition to the services rendered to the treasury, gave for its charter, and for the use of the public deposits, a bonus or outright sum of one million and a half of dollars.  This sum was paid by the bank into the treasury soon after the commencement of its charter.  In the act which passed both houses for renewing the charter, in 1832, it was provided that the bank, for the same consideration, should pay two hundred thousand dollars a year during the period for which it was proposed to renew it.  A similar provision is in the bill which I asked leave to introduce some weeks ago.  Now, Sir, this shows that the custody of the deposits is a benefit for which a bank may well afford to pay a large annual sum.  The banks which now hold the deposits pay nothing to the public; they give no bonus, they pay no annuity.  But this loss of so much money is not the worst part of the case, nor that which ought most to alarm us.  Although they pay nothing to the public, they do pay, nevertheless, such sums, and for such uses, as may be agreed upon between themselves and the executive government.  We are officially informed that an officer is appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury to inspect or superintend these selected banks; and this officer is compensated by a salary fixed by the executive, agreed to by the banks, and paid by them.  I ask, Sir, if there can be a more irregular or a more illegal transaction than this?  Whose money is it out of which this salary is paid?  Is it not money justly due to the United States, and paid, because it is so due, for the advantage of holding the deposits?  If a dollar is received on that account, is not its only true destination into the general treasury of the government?  And who has authority, without law, to create an office, to fix a salary, and to pay