Now, Sir, it is precisely this which I deem an assumption of power not conferred by the Constitution and laws.  I think the law did not give this authority to the President, nor impose on him the responsibility of its exercise.  It is evident that, in this removal, the Secretary was in reality nothing but the scribe; he was the pen in the President’s hand, and no more.  Nothing depended on his discretion, his judgment, or his responsibility.  The removal, indeed, has been admitted and defended in the Senate, as the direct act of the President himself.  This, Sir, is what I call assumption of power.  If the President had issued an order for the removal of the deposits in his own name, and under his own hand, it would have been an illegal order, and the bank would not have been at liberty to obey it.  For the same reason, if the Secretary’s order had recited that it was issued by the President’s direction, and on the President’s authority, it would have shown on its face that it was illegal and invalid.  No one can doubt that.  The act of removal, to be lawful, must be the bona fide act of the Secretary; his judgment, the result of his deliberations, the volition of his mind.  All are able to see the difference between the power to remove the Secretary from office, and the power to control him, in all or any of his duties, while in office.  The law charges the officer, whoever he may be, with the performance of certain duties.  The President, with the consent of the Senate, appoints an individual to be such officer; and this individual he may remove, if he so please; but, until removed, he is the officer, and remains charged with the duties of his station, duties which nobody else can perform, and for the neglect or violation of which he is liable to be impeached.

The distinction is visible and broad between the power of removal and the power to control an officer not removed.  The President, it is true, may terminate his political life; but he cannot control his powers and functions, and act upon him as a mere machine, while he is allowed to live.  The power of control and direction, nowhere given, certainly, by any express provision of the Constitution or laws, is derived, by those who maintain it, from the right of removal; that is to say, it is a constructive power; it has no express warrant in the Constitution.  A very important power, then, is raised by construction in the first place; and being thus raised, it becomes a fountain out of which other important powers, raised also by construction, are to be supplied.  There is no little danger that such a mode of reasoning may be carried too far.  It cannot be maintained that the power of direct control necessarily flows from the power of removal.  Suppose it had been decided in 1789, when the question was debated, that the President does not possess the power of removal; will it be contended, that, in that case, his right of interference with the acts and duties of executive officers would be less than it now is?  The reason of the thing would seem to be the other way.  If the President may remove an incumbent when he becomes satisfied of his unfaithfulness and incapacity, there would appear to be less necessity to give him also a right of control, than there would be if he could not remove him.