it.  When they shall meet, as we now meet, to do themselves and him that honor, so surely as they shall see the blue summits of his native mountains rise in the horizon, so surely as they shall behold the river on whose banks he lived, and on whose banks he rests, still flowing on toward the sea, so surely may they see, as we now see, the flag of the Union floating on the top of the Capitol; and then, as now, may the sun in his course visit no land more free, more happy, more lovely, than this our own country!

Gentlemen, I propose—­“THE MEMORY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON.”

[Footnote 1:  See Works of Fisher Ames, pp. 122, 123.]

EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE AND REMOVALS FROM OFFICE.

FROM A SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONVENTION HELD AT
WORCESTER (MASS.), ON THE 12th OF OCTOBER, 1832.

I begin, Sir, with the subject of removals from office for opinion’s sake, one of the most signal instances, as I think, of the attempt to extend executive power.  This has been a leading measure, a cardinal point, in the course of the administration.  It has proceeded, from the first, on a settled proscription for political opinions; and this system it has carried into operation to the full extent of its ability.  The President has not only filled all vacancies with his own friends, generally those most distinguished as personal partisans, but he has turned out political opponents, and thus created vacancies, in order that he might fill them with his own friends.  I think the number of removals and appointments is said to be two thousand.  While the administration and its friends have been attempting to circumscribe and to decry the powers belonging to other branches, it has thus seized into its own hands a patronage most pernicious and corrupting, an authority over men’s means of living most tyrannical and odious, and a power to punish free men for political opinions altogether intolerable.

You will remember, Sir, that the Constitution says not one word about the President’s power of removal from office.  It is a power raised entirely by construction.  It is a constructive power, introduced at first to meet cases of extreme public necessity.  It has now become coextensive with the executive will, calling for no necessity, requiring no exigency for its exercise; to be employed at all times, without control, without question, without responsibility.  When the question of the President’s power of removal was debated in the first Congress, those who argued for it limited it to extreme cases.  Cases, they said, might arise, in which it would be absolutely necessary to remove an officer before the Senate could be assembled.  An officer might become insane; he might abscond; and from these and other supposable cases, it was said, the public service might materially suffer if the President could not remove the incumbent.  And it was further said,