But the President does not admit the authority of precedent.  Sir, I have always found, that those who habitually deny most vehemently the general force of precedent, and assert most strongly the supremacy of private opinion, are yet, of all men, most tenacious of that very authority of precedent, whenever it happens to be in their favor.  I beg leave to ask, Sir, upon what ground, except that of precedent, and precedent alone, the President’s friends have placed his power of removal from office.  No such power is given by the Constitution, in terms, nor anywhere intimated, throughout the whole of it; no paragraph or clause of that instrument recognizes such a power.  To say the least, it is as questionable, and has been as often questioned, as the power of Congress to create a bank; and, enlightened by what has passed under our own observation, we now see that it is of all powers the most capable of flagrant abuse.  Now, Sir, I ask again, What becomes of this power, if the authority of precedent be taken away?  It has all along been denied to exist; it is nowhere found in the Constitution; and its recent exercise, or, to call things by their right names, its recent abuse, has, more than any other single cause, rendered good men either cool in their affections toward the government of their country, or doubtful of its long continuance.  Yet there is precedent in favor of this power, and the President exercises it.  We know, Sir, that, without the aid of that precedent, his acts could never have received the sanction of this body, even at a time when his voice was somewhat more potential here than it now is, or, as I trust, ever again will be.  Does the President, then, reject the authority of all precedent except what it is suitable to his own purpose to use?  And does he use, without stint or measure, all precedents which may augment his own power, or gratify his own wishes?

But if the President thinks lightly of the authority of Congress in construing the Constitution, he thinks still more lightly of the authority of the Supreme Court.  He asserts a right of individual judgment on constitutional questions, which is totally inconsistent with any proper administration of the government, or any regular execution of the laws.  Social disorder, entire uncertainty in regard to individual rights and individual duties, the cessation of legal anthority, confusion, the dissolution of free government,—­all these are the inevitable consequences of the principles adopted by the message, whenever they shall be carried to their full extent.  Hitherto it has been thought that the final decision of constitutional questions belonged to the supreme judicial tribunal.  The very nature of free government, it has been supposed, enjoins this; and our Constitution, moreover, has been understood so to provide, clearly and expressly.  It is true, that each branch of the legislature has an undoubted right, in the exercise of its functions, to consider the constitutionality of a law proposed