But, Gentlemen, the judicial department, under the Constitution of the United States, possesses still higher duties.  It is true, that it may be called on, and is occasionally called on, to decide questions which are, in one sense, of a political nature.  The general and State governments, both established by the people, are established for different purposes, and with different powers.  Between those powers questions may arise; and who shall decide them?  Some provision for this end is absolutely necessary.  What shall it be?  This was the question before the Convention; and various schemes were suggested.  It was foreseen that the States might inadvertently pass laws inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or with acts of Congress.  At least, laws might be passed which would be charged with such inconsistency.  How should these questions be disposed of?  Where shall the power of judging, in cases of alleged interference, be lodged?  One suggestion in the Convention was, to make it an executive power, and to lodge it in the hands of the President, by requiring all State laws to be submitted to him, that he might negative such as he thought appeared repugnant to the general Constitution.  This idea, perhaps, may have been borrowed from the power exercised by the crown over the laws of the Colonies.  It would evidently have been, not only an inconvenient and troublesome proceeding, but dangerous also to the powers of the States.  It was not pressed.  It was thought wiser and safer, on the whole, to require State legislatures and State judges to take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, and then leave the States at liberty to pass whatever laws they pleased, and if interference, in point of fact, should arise, to refer the question to judicial decision.  To this end, the judicial power, under the Constitution of the United States, was made coextensive with the legislative power.  It was extended to all cases arising under the Constitution and the laws of Congress.  The judiciary became thus possessed of the authority of deciding, in the last resort, in all cases of alleged interference, between State laws and the Constitution and laws of Congress.

Gentlemen, this is the actual Constitution, this is the law of the land.  There may be those who think it unnecessary, or who would prefer a different mode of deciding such questions.  But this is the established mode, and, till it be altered, the courts can no more decline their duty on these occasions than on other occasions.  But can any reasonable man doubt the expediency of this provision, or suggest a better?  Is it not absolutely essential to the peace of the country that this power should exist somewhere?  Where can it exist, better than where it now does exist?  The national judiciary is the common tribunal of the whole country.  It is organized by the common authority, and its places filled by the common agent.  This is a plain and practical provision.  It was framed by no bunglers, nor by any wild theorists.  And who can say that it has failed?  Who can find substantial fault with its operation or its results?  The great question is, whether we shall provide for the peaceable decision of cases of collision.  Shall they be decided by law, or by force?  Shall the decisions be decisions of peace, or decisions of war?