It is undeniably true, then, that the framers of the Constitution intended to create a national judicial power, which should be paramount on national subjects.  And after the Constitution was framed, and while the whole country was engaged in discussing its merits, one of its most distinguished advocates, Mr. Madison, told the people that it was true, that, in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide is to be established under the general government.  Mr. Martin, who had been a member of the Convention, asserted the same thing to the legislature of Maryland, and urged it as a reason for rejecting the Constitution.  Mr. Pinckney, himself also a leading member of the Convention, declared it to the people of South Carolina.  Everywhere it was admitted, by friends and foes, that this power was in the Constitution.  By some it was thought dangerous, by most it was thought necessary; but by all it was agreed to be a power actually contained in the instrument.  The Convention saw the absolute necessity of some control in the national government over State laws.  Different modes of establishing this control were suggested and considered.  At one time, it was proposed that the laws of the States should, from time to time, be laid before Congress, and that Congress should possess a negative over them.  But this was thought inexpedient and inadmissible; and in its place, and expressly as a substitute for it, the existing provision was introduced; that is to say, a provision by which the federal courts should have authority to overrule such State laws as might be in manifest contravention of the Constitution.  The writers of the Federalist, in explaining the Constitution, while it was yet pending before the people, and still unadopted, give this account of the matter in terms, and assign this reason for the article as it now stands.  By this provision Congress escaped the necessity of any revision of State laws, left the whole sphere of State legislation quite untouched, and yet obtained a security against any infringement of the constitutional power of the general government.  Indeed, Sir, allow me to ask again, if the national judiciary was not to exercise a power of revision on constitutional questions over the judicatures of the States, why was any national judicature erected at all?  Can any man give a sensible reason for having a judicial power in this government, unless it be for the sake of maintaining a uniformity of decision on questions arising under the Constitution and laws of Congress, and insuring its execution?  And does not this very idea of uniformity necessarily imply that the construction given by the national courts is to be the prevailing construction?  How else, Sir, is it possible that uniformity can be preserved?