was assented to, and an instrument was presented to the people of the several States for their consideration.  They approved it, and agreed to adopt it, as a Constitution.  They executed that agreement; they adopted the Constitution as a Constitution, and henceforth it must stand as a Constitution until it shall be altogether destroyed.  Now, Sir, is not this the truth of the whole matter?  And is not all that we have heard of compact between sovereign States the mere effect of a theoretical and artificial mode of reasoning upon the subject? a mode of reasoning which disregards plain facts for the sake of hypothesis?

Mr. President, the nature of sovereignty or sovereign power has been extensively discussed by gentlemen on this occasion, as it generally is when the origin of our government is debated.  But I confess myself not entirely satisfied with arguments and illustrations drawn from that topic.  The sovereignty of government is an idea belonging to the other side of the Atlantic.  No such thing is known in North America.  Our governments are all limited.  In Europe, sovereignty is of feudal origin, and imports no more than the state of the sovereign.  It comprises his rights, duties, exemptions, prerogatives, and powers.  But with us, all power is with the people.  They alone are sovereign; and they erect what governments they please, and confer on them such powers as they please.  None of these governments is sovereign, in the European sense of the word, all being restrained by written constitutions.  It seems to me, therefore, that we only perplex ourselves when we attempt to explain the relations existing between the general government and the several State governments, according to those ideas of sovereignty which prevail under systems essentially different from our own.

But, Sir, to return to the Constitution itself; let me inquire what it relies upon for its own continuance and support.  I hear it often suggested, that the States, by refusing to appoint Senators and Electors, might bring this government to an end.  Perhaps that is true; but the same may be said of the State governments themselves.  Suppose the legislature of a State, having the power to appoint the governor and the judges, should omit that duty, would not the State government remain unorganized?  No doubt, all elective governments may be broken up by a general abandonment, on the part of those intrusted with political powers, of their appropriate duties.  But one popular government has, in this respect, as much security as another.  The maintenance of this Constitution does not depend on the plighted faith of the States, as States, to support it; and this again shows that it is not a league.  It relies on individual duty and obligation.

The Constitution of the United States creates direct relations between this government and individuals.  This government may punish individuals for treason, and all other crimes in the code, when committed against the United States.  It has power, also, to tax individuals, in any mode, and to any extent; and it possesses the further power of demanding from individuals military service.  Nothing, certainly, can more clearly distinguish a government from a confederation of states than the possession of these powers.  No closer relations can exist between individuals and any government.