We contend, that the Constitution has not left its work thus unfinished.  We contend, that, taking its provisions together, it is apparent it was intended to provide for two things, intimately connected with each other.  These are,—­

1.  A medium for the payment of debts; and,

2.  A uniform manner of discharging debts, when they are to be discharged without payment.

The arrangement of the grants and prohibitions contained in the Constitution is fit to be regarded on this occasion.  The grant to Congress and the prohibition on the States, though they are certainly to be construed together, are not contained in the same clauses.  The powers granted to Congress are enumerated one after another in the eighth section; the principal limitations on those powers, in the ninth section; and the prohibitions to the States, in the tenth section.  Now, in order to understand whether any particular power be exclusively vested in Congress, it is necessary to read the terms of the grant, together with the terms of the prohibition.  Take an example from that power of which we have been speaking, the coinage power.  Here the grant to Congress is, “To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coins.”  Now, the correlative prohibition on the States, though found in another section, is undoubtedly to be taken in immediate connection with the foregoing, as much as if it had been found in the same clause.  The only just reading of these provisions, therefore, is this:  “Congress shall have power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin; but no State shall coin money, emit bills of credit, or make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.”

These provisions respect the medium of payment, or standard of value, and, thus collated, their joint result is clear and decisive.  We think the result clear, also, of those provisions which respect the discharge of debts without payment.  Collated in like manner, they stand thus:  “Congress shall have power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States, but no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.”  This collocation cannot be objected to, if they refer to the same subject-matter; and that they do refer to the same subject-matter we have the authority of this court for saying, because this court solemnly determined, in Sturges v.  Crowninshield, that this prohibition on the States did apply to systems of bankruptcy.  It must be now taken, therefore, that State bankrupt laws were in the mind of the Convention when the prohibition was adopted, and therefore the grant to Congress on the subject of bankrupt laws, and the prohibition to the States on the same subject, are properly to be taken and read together; and being thus read together, is not the intention clear to take away from the States the power of passing bankrupt laws, since, while enacted by them, such laws would not be uniform, and to confer the power exclusively on Congress, by whom uniform laws could be established?