present and to come, from the fact of living in it, than it is to imply a particular assent to a particular existing enactment.  The true view of the matter is, that every man is presumed to submit to all power which may be lawfully exercised over him or his right, and no one should be presumed to submit to illegal acts of power, whether actual or contingent. (5.) But a main objection to this argument is, that it would render the whole constitutional provision idle and inoperative; and no explanatory words, if such words had been added in the Constitution, could have prevented this consequence.  The law, it is said, is part of the contract; it cannot, therefore, impair the contract, because a contract cannot impair itself.  Now, if this argument be sound, the case would have been the same, whatever words the Constitution had used.  If, for example, it had declared that no State should pass any law impairing contracts prospectively or retrospectively; or any law impairing contracts, whether existing or future; or, whatever terms it had used to prohibit precisely such a law as is now before the court,—­the prohibition would be totally nugatory if the law is to be taken as part of the contract; and the result would be, that, whatever may be the laws which the States by this clause of the Constitution are prohibited from passing, yet, if they in fact do pass such laws, those laws are valid, and bind parties by a supposed assent.

But further, this idea, if well founded, would enable the States to defeat the whole constitutional provision by a general enactment.  Suppose a State should declare, by law, that all contracts entered into therein should be subject to such laws as the legislature, at any time, or from time to time, might see fit to pass.  This law, according to the argument, would enter into the contract, become a part of it, and authorize the interference of the legislative power with it, for any and all purposes, wholly uncontrolled by the Constitution of the United States.

So much for the argument that the law is a part of the contract.  We think it is shown to be not so; and if it were, the expected consequence would not follow.

The inquiry, then, recurs, whether the law in question be such a law as the legislature of New York had authority to pass.  The question is general.  We differ from our learned adversaries on general principles.  We differ as to the main scope and end of this constitutional provision.  They think it entirely remedial; we regard it as preventive.  They think it adopted to secure redress for violated private rights; to us, it seems intended to guard against great public mischiefs.  They argue it as if it were designed as an indemnity or protection for injured private rights, in individual cases of meum and tuum; we look upon it as a great political provision, favorable to the commerce and credit of the whole country.  Certainly we do not deny its application to cases of violated